Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance by Karmel, Roberta S.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
8-2002
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing
Standards and Corporate Governance
Roberta S. Karmel
Brooklyn Law School, roberta.karmel@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Other Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
57 Bus. L. 1487 (2001-2002)
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards
and Corporate Governance
By a Special Study Group* of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law
UPDATE
Since the publication of the Study on May 17, 2002, both the New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc. (NYSE) and The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq) have proposed ex-
tensive changes to their respective governance listing standards subject to Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) authorization. At this time, the proposals by the two
markets differ in certain respects. Principally, the proposed listing standards involve
mandatory measures that increase the role of independent directors, require that a board
have a majority of independent directors, require that only independent directors com-
prise the audit committee and potentially other committees and provide for other cor-
porate governance matters. On July 24, 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA)
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility issued its Preliminary Report containing cor-
porate governance recommendations, including mandatory listing standards that are in
many respects similar to those proposed by the NYSE.
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted which, among other things,
mandates certain corporate governance listing standards by directing the SEC to estab-
lish rules which prohibit the listing of any securities of an issuer which does not have
an audit committee comprised of independent directors with specified oversight and
authority in dealing with independent directors.
These initiatives represent an expanded use of listing standards for corporate gov-
ernance purposes and in that respect differ from the Study's recommended approach.
Nevertheless, the Study is pertinent as to the role and authority of the exchanges and
the SEC in matters of corporate governance and the exploration of alternatives for
establishing corporate governance standards relevant to the integrity of the securities
markets and fundamental fairness to investors.
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PREFACE
This Study has been undertaken by a Special Study Group of the Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities of the ABA Section of Business Law. It does
not represent the official position of the ABA, the Section or the Committee. The
views expressed in this Study represent a consensus among members of the Spe-
cial Study Group but do not necessarily represent the views of any firm or insti-
tution with whom any member is affiliated or any client of any such firm. Annex
A describes the background and experience of each of the members of the Special
Study Group.
As part of the Study, interviews were conducted with members of the staff of
the SEC and representatives of the primary U.S. markets, alternative trading sys-
tems, institutional investors and others who participate in the securities markets
or are otherwise involved in corporate governance. We appreciate greatly the
cooperation of those we interviewed and their candid expression of views. Since
all the interviews were confidential, no part of this Study should be attributed to
anyone who participated in an interview The interviews themselves, most of
which preceded the events of September 11, 2001 and the current concerns as
to accounting irregularities and governance practices, were insightful and of con-
siderable assistance to us in formulating market, regulatory and corporate gov-
ernance perspectives on the subject matter. A summary of the interview results is
set forth in Annex B.
The members of the Special Study Group gratefully acknowledge the assistance
of Holly J. Gregory, Priya Marwah, Craig N. Meurlin, David Murgio, Stephanie
Nicolas, Amy Reynolds, Hochan Rhee, Ashley Wakefield and HansJ. Weinburger.
The members of the Special Study Group also appreciate the support of Stanley
Keller, Chair of the Committee.
In March 2002, the ABA formed a Task Force on Corporate Responsibility to
examine the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure systems applicable to
public companies in the United States. Its purpose is to enable the ABA to con-
tribute to the dialogue on legislative and regulatory reform to improve corporate
responsibility. Inasmuch as the Study was initiated in November 2000, it is in-
dependent of the work of the Task Force, which we support. Members of the
Special Study Group are hopeful that this Study will be of value to the efforts of
the Task Force.
SUMMARY
In this Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate
Governance (Study), we examine the role of the SEC and exchanges' in matters
pertaining to corporate governance. We consider this subject in the context of the
unique corporate governance system that exists in the United States, where state
1. Except where the context otherwise requires, we use the terms "exchange" and "self-regulatory
organizations" (SROs) interchangeably to refer to the registered national securities exchanges and The
Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq), although at the time of this writing Nasdaq's application for
registration as a national securities exchange is pending.
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law is the primary source of corporate law and the federal securities laws super-
impose a separate layer of regulation on public companies. Listing standards
adopted by exchanges deal selectively with corporate governance matters affecting
the securities markets and investors. Corporate governance listing standards fill,
at least in part, the sizeable gap between state corporate law and the federal
securities laws.
When this Study was commenced in November 2000, our primary interest was
the future of exchange-listing standards as a means of establishing corporate gov-
ernance measures in light of the rapidly evolving securities marketplace and the
increasing challenges to the primacy of the traditional exchanges. Our primary
concern was the extent to which competition from alternative trading systems
(ATSs) might undermine the willingness or ability of the exchanges to set gov-
ernance standards for their listed issuers and the alternatives to the current role
of the exchanges in corporate governance.
During the period of this Study, however, a number of well-publicized corporate
failures have focused attention on current corporate governance practices and the
need to maintain investor confidence in the markets. Various suggestions and
proposals, based on a perceived need to improve the corporate governance of
public companies, have been articulated by members of the Congress, the SEC,
the exchanges, investor groups, trade associations and other interested parties. As
a result, the core issues addressed in this Study have become of more immediate
import. Although we acknowledge these developments and the perception that
improvements in corporate governance processes are needed, this Study does not
address specific governance measures.
Rather, as described below, we recommend a proposal involving the develop-
ment of best practices guidelines and the implementation of a "comply or explain"
approach (Proposal). Under the Proposal, the NYSE and Nasdaq would act jointly,
subject to SEC authorization, to establish a protocol for the development of non-
binding best practices guidelines limited to those governance matters necessary
for, and directly relevant to, the integrity of the securities markets and funda-
mental fairness to investors. These best practices guidelines would be created
jointly by the NYSE and Nasdaq through an open and collaborative process that
includes the participation of representatives of the SEC, investors, issuers, member
firms and academicians. The protocol should also include provisions to ensure
the uniform application and joint interpretation of the best practices guidelines.
We believe the SEC should issue an order authorizing these joint activities and
establishing procedures for joint action. Finally, the SEC should adopt a rule
requiring public disclosure by each listed company as to whether it complies with
the exchange-established best practices guidelines or explaining the reasons for
any areas of noncompliance. Therefore, although compliance with the governance
guidelines would not be mandatory, issuers would be required to provide investors
with information concerning their level of compliance (or noncompliance).
This Study recognizes the unique role and interest of exchanges in corporate
governance. The operation of successful securities markets depends upon the
integrity of listed companies and the fair treatment of investors. These factors are
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essential to the confidence of investors, the prestige of the exchanges and the
ability of the exchanges to be competitive. We believe the exchanges, issuers and
investors share a common interest in good governance practices. These conclu-
sions are an important part of the Proposal and our analysis.
As part of the Study, we examine subject matter related to corporate governance
and the capital markets. Section I addresses the history and role of corporate
governance listing standards in the U.S. markets. Since their inception in the late
nineteenth century, corporate governance listing standards have evolved from
terms in an individualized written agreement between an issuer and a listing
exchange into a set of exchange-established rules that are limited in scope and
address a selective group of corporate governance matters. These standards are
relatively uniform. Delisting for noncompliance with these standards is rare; the
exchanges tend to encourage compliance through negotiation with issuers. Al-
though corporate governance listing standards, historically, have been used by the
NYSE to establish a "brand" associated with high quality issuers, at various times,
both the American Stock Exchange LLC (Amex) and Nasdaq have adopted less
stringent corporate governance listing standards to compete with the NYSE for
listings. As a result, since at least the 1970s, the SEC has sought to encourage
uniformity among NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq corporate governance listing stan-
dards. In addition, during this period, the process by which these standards are
adopted has been transformed into a forum for the public debate of governance
issues and standards among the exchanges, the SEC, issuers, investors and other
interested parties.
In Section 11, we examine issues relating to exchange and SEC authority over
corporate governance listing standards. Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act), 2 describes the process for the adoption of
self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules, including corporate governance listing
standards, whether such rules are proposed by the applicable SRO or imposed
by the SEC. These section 19 processes were further defined by the 1990 opinion
of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Business Roundtable v. SEC,3 which rejected
the SEC's attempt to invoke section 19(c) to impose a voting rights listing
standard. Business Roundtable suggests there is no evidence of direct congressional
intent to grant the SEC authority to establish a comprehensive federal corporate
law through the imposition of listing standards. After Business Roundtable the scope
of direct SEC authority over corporate governance listing standards pursuant to
section 19(c) is uncertain, but in any event, it is limited to matters that are in
furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. The SEC has not sought to
invoke its section 19(c) authority to require listing standards since Business Round-
table, at least in part due to this uncertainty We also examine the SEC's authority
under section 1 1A of the Exchange Act to "authorize or require" exchanges to
take joint action with respect to certain matters relating to the operation of a
2. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(h)(3) (2000) [hereinafter Ex-
change Actl.
3. 905 F2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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national market system. An SEC rule or order authorizing joint action by SROs
pursuant to section 1 A may support a finding of implied repeal of the anti-
trust laws with respect to the joint activities of the participating SROs as to
these matters.
4
Section III addresses the recent evolution of the securities marketplace, includ-
ing market fragmentation caused by the proliferation of ATSs and international-
ization and its effect on corporate governance listing standards. As registered
broker-dealers, ATSs are exempt from registration as securities exchanges, subject
to SEC authority to require a particular ATS to register as an exchange and, there-
fore, are not obligated to impose substantive regulation on traders using their
execution services or on issuers of securities traded in their markets. Moreover,
most ATSs do not have any intention or desire to list companies or to establish
listing standards. One response to the competitive pressures caused by increasing
fragmentation has been the decision by Nasdaq to demutualize. Yet, demutuali-
zation raises potential conflicts of interest between profit-seeking and regulatory
interests. Accordingly, the SEC has set a number of conditions to its approval of
Nasdaq's demutualization that are intended to reduce these conflicts. The extent
to which a shift in liquidity from the NYSE and Nasdaq to ATSs or otherwise
could undermine the current listing process is not presently determinable.
Section IV examines corporate governance regulation and practices outside the
United States in a sample of seven jurisdictions for comparative purposes. We
found that the majority of the substantive NYSE and Nasdaq corporate governance
listing standards are addressed in each of the analyzed foreign jurisdictions,
whether by direct government regulation, nonbinding corporate governance
codes or in some cases exchange-established listing standards. With few excep-
tions (including the recent corporate governance initiatives of the Brazilian Novo
Mercado), foreign exchanges generally do not set corporate governance standards
for listed issuers. Perhaps as a result, outside of the United States there appears
to be a much greater reliance on nonbinding best practices codes to establish
corporate governance standards, including recently promulgated rules in the
United Kingdom and Germany requiring that public companies disclose whether
they comply with a specified code and explain any areas of noncompliance. As
in the United States, foreign markets are experiencing fragmentation and ex-
4. Under the doctrine of "implied repeal," a repeal of the antitrust laws may be inferred when
"necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work." Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see
also Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 689-90 (1975) (holding that "[gliven the expertise of the SEC,
the confidence the Congress has placed in the agency, and the active roles the SEC and the Congress
have taken, permitting courts throughout the country to conduct their own antitrust proceedings
would conflict with the regulatory scheme authorized by Congress [through the Exchange Act] rather
than supplement that scheme."); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694,
734-35 (1975) (holding that "implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that the
federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could carry out that responsibility free
from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws."). The court, in National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., further held
that implied immunity also protects regulated entities from being "subjected to duplicative and in-
consistent standards." 422 U.S. at 734-35.
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changes are demutualizing. These developments present structural issues similar
to those we face in this country.
Section V includes an analysis of and various alternatives to the present system
and the Proposal. Consideration of alternatives is instructive, both to define
what may be available for future action and to evaluate their usefulness on a
current basis. We do not expect any of these alternatives to be as immediately
effective as the Proposal in connection with governance measures that need to
be established. Furthermore, implementation of the Proposal does not preclude
the exchanges from taking other action, including the adoption of additional
listing standards.
PROPOSAL
On March 13, 2002, we submitted a memorandum to the Chairman of the
SEC and to the Chairmen of the NYSE and Nasdaq.5 In our memorandum, we
made an interim proposal that the exchanges recommend a set of appropriate
nonbinding best practices designed to deal with current issues in corporate gov-
ernance, particularly as they pertain to the integrity of the securities markets and
fairness to investors. We further recommended that the SEC adopt a rule requiring
that listed issuers make public disclosure as to whether they comply with the best
practices guidelines of the exchange on which they are listed or explain any areas
of noncompliance. Today, having completed our Study and considered the alter-
natives, we submit the Proposal as set forth below.
We recommend that the NYSE and Nasdaq jointly act, under SEC authoriza-
tion, to establish a protocol for the ongoing development of best practices guide-
lines and the interpretation, amendment and repeal of such guidelines in accor-
dance with the following principles:
" The best practices guidelines should be nonbinding and limited to the
corporate governance areas that are necessary for and directly relevant to
the maintenance of the integrity of the securities markets and fairness
to investors.
" The best practices guidelines should, where appropriate, allow for differ-
ences among issuers, including size and other relevant factors.
" The NYSE and Nasdaq should act jointly to create the best practices guide-
lines, and review them on an ongoing basis through a process that includes
publication, public comment and the active participation of the SEC, in-
vestors, issuers, member firms and academicians.
• The NYSE and Nasdaq should jointly establish a process to ensure
the uniform application and joint interpretation of these best practices
guidelines.
" The best practices guidelines, as well as all written interpretations of the
guidelines, should be publicly available.
5. A copy of this memorandum is annexed to this Study as Annex C.
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Moreover, to facilitate the creation of, and compliance with, these best practices
guidelines, we recommend that the SEC take the following actions:
" Issue a rule or an order under section 1 A of the Exchange Act authorizing
this plan for joint action and establishing procedures for the joint action.
" Adopt a rule requiring disclosure by each listed company in its periodic
reports, proxy materials or other public filings as to whether it complies
with these best practices guidelines or to explain the reasons for its non-
compliance. Disclosure of material changes in an issuer's practices may be
required in an interim filing.
Under the Proposal, the best practices guidelines would not be binding but
compliance would be encouraged through the comply or explain mechanism. It
is our view that boards of directors would be motivated to comply substantially
with these best practices because of the increased recognition of the benefits of
maintaining good governance practices and the likelihood that shareholders will
question the reason for noncompliance as a result of disclosure. Existing listing
standards would remain in effect unless amended or repealed under current stat-
utory procedures. Additional or amended listing standards could be proposed by
the NYSE and Nasdaq, acting singly or through joint action. We believe that best
practices, however, should be used for most governance measures.
While we recognize that there are many important differences with respect to
the establishment of corporate governance standards outside the United States,
we believe that the U.K. comply or explain system (a variation of which has
recently been adopted in Germany) serves as a useful precedent for the American
capital markets. We note certain differences in the U.K.'s system, including that
a British issuer's disclosure must be reviewed by its auditors before publication,
and the auditors' report on the financial statements also covers other required
disclosures. 6 In addition, the U.K. Combined Code, which is the code referenced
by the comply or explain rule, 7 is an "official" code, with a subject matter that
greatly exceeds the limited set of best practices guidelines relating to the securities
markets that are contemplated by the Proposal. Accordingly, our recommendation
that the subject matter of the best practices guidelines be limited would narrow
the application of the comply or explain mechanism as compared to the United
Kingdom, but at the same time should accomplish the purposes of best practices
in relation to the securities markets and the interests of investors.
The disclosure would enable a company to signify compliance with certain of
the best practices and explain why noncompliance exists with respect to others.
This form of disclosure would be subject to the review and oversight, and be the
responsibility of, the board of directors or an appointed committee of the board.
While it is contemplated that this disclosure would occur annually, if there are
material changes with respect to compliance, it may become reportable in a quar-
terly report or, depending on its significance, on Form 8-K.
6. FIN. SERvs. AUTH., UNITED KINGDOM LISTING AUTHORITY, LISTING RULES § 12.43A (2002) [here-
inafter U.K.L.A. LISTING RULES].
7. Id.
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An appropriate interest of the securities markets and the SEC is to maintain
high governance standards to ensure fairness to investors and the integrity and
reliability of the securities markets. The exchanges currently have the experience
and the economic incentive to adopt a leadership role in the ongoing development
of these standards. Best practices will likely provide more flexibility than listing
standards, dispense with issues regarding legal authority and render unnecessary
more sweeping changes in the system to accomplish the governance objectives.
This approach also is consistent with the development and use of corporate gov-
ernance codes, which also are nonbinding. Joint action by the NYSE and Nasdaq
will promote uniformity in best practices and will facilitate uniform interpretation,
amendment and repeal where appropriate. This process also will enable interested
parties, including shareholders, issuers and the SEC, to participate actively in the
establishment of the guidelines.
The SEC will participate in two ways, namely, the establishment of a protocol
under section 1 1A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act regarding the process to be followed
by the exchanges in the exercise of joint action and by adopting a comply or
explain rule with respect to compliance with best practices. It also may monitor
the process and express views on various best practices proposals. A significant
advantage of the Proposal is that it will not involve systemic changes and therefore
can be implemented in the near term without the risks and uncertainty that can
accompany major changes. Moreover, with the support of the exchanges and other
interested groups, it has every prospect of being effective.
Part of our consideration in formulating the Proposal was to avoid the diffi-
culties arising from questions relating to authority We believe that best practices
guidelines established by the NYSE and Nasdaq would not be "rules" under the
Exchange Act because they are not binding. Therefore, they would not require
SEC approval under section 19 of the Exchange Act. Furthermore, sections 13
and 14 of the Exchange Act provide the SEC with ample authority to adopt rules
requiring public disclosure of an issuer's compliance with exchange-established
best practices guidelines and an explanation of areas of noncompliance.
The Proposal is intended to build on the most advantageous features of the
current system. For example, although the Proposal provides that the NYSE and
Nasdaq would voluntarily enter a process that will result in the creation of non-
binding standards, nothing would preclude either of them from adopting or
amending their listing standards. Furthermore, by calling on the NYSE and Nas-
daq to create these guidelines through an open and collaborative process, a forum
would be established to discuss and act upon relevant and current governance
matters. Lastly, given the reality that the only existing enforcement mechanism
for corporate governance listing standards is the infrequently used delisting pro-
cess, acceptance of these nonbinding guidelines coupled with required public
disclosure would allow market forces to determine the extent to which noncom-
pliance with a given standard is acceptable to investors.
In our view, implementation of the Proposal would provide an effective frame-
work to deal with current governance issues as they relate to the markets and
investors while taking advantage of the strengths of and experience with the ex-
isting system. Moreover, additional initiatives are not precluded.
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Whether or not the Proposal is acceptable to the exchanges, the SEC could
adopt a rule requiring disclosure by issuers in their periodic reports, proxy ma-
terials or other public filings as to their policies and practices concerning relevant
corporate governance matters. We believe as a general matter the SEC likely has
such disclosure authority This approach would provide certain benefits of the
Proposal, although it would offer no initial or ongoing benchmark in the sense
of an aspirational model.
Alternatively, the exchanges, rather than the SEC, could adopt a listing standard
requiring periodic disclosure of essentially the same policies and practices. Such
a requirement, upon SEC approval pursuant to section 19(b), would likely with-
stand any legal challenge.
Should an initiative other than the Proposal be pursued with exchange partic-
ipation, we would urge that it be consistent, to the extent applicable, with the
following principles:
• Care should be taken to minimize systemic change so that the benefits of
the existing system are not lost.
" Corporate governance standards should be made uniform wherever
possible, both in the interest of fairness and to facilitate compliance and
comparability
" Although each exchange may elect from time to time to establish new or
amended governance listing standards in specific areas, they should con-
tinue to consider a best practices approach for matters not covered by
listing standards.
" In the establishment of governance measures, there should be recognition
of the needs and requirements of a wide variety of corporate issuers.
" The exchanges should maintain active participation in the corporate gov-
ernance process, given their experience in these matters, their incentive to
set high standards and their ability to provide a forum for discussion on
relevant governance issues.
Section V describes alternatives should the exchanges not be active participants
in the process. One alternative would be a private sector initiative which, among
other things, could provide structure for a system of codes or best practices to
maintain high governance standards. In any event, the principles of uniformity
and recognition of the needs of different kinds of issuers should be considered.
SECTION I.
LISTING STANDARDS IN THE U.S. MARKETS
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LISTING STANDARDS
Exchange-established requirements for listed securities8 are designed to pro-
mote liquidity and transferability of shares by increasing investor confidence in
8. Except where the context otherwise requires, in this Study all references to securities listed on
the NYSE, Amex or quoted on Nasdaq are "listed."
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both the markets and listed issuers. Most of these requirements are quantitative
standards and focus primarily on numerical indicators and include requirements
related to a listed company's public float, annual revenues, assets, cash flow and/
or market capitalization.9 Other standards, however, go directly to a listed com-
pany's internal structure and conduct. These requirements, known collectively
as corporate governance listing standards, are intended "to encourage high stan-
dards of corporate democracy" by mandating that listed companies maintain
"appropriate standards of corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability
to shareholders."'0 As a result, they are also intended to promote liquidity and
transferability.
The historical development of corporate governance listing standards by the
NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq can be attributed to a variety of factors. Clearly a
desire on the part of the exchanges to lend stability to the capital markets by
permitting access only to issuers with good governance practices has been an
important influence in the development of these standards. Perhaps equally im-
portant, however, has been the competitive desire of the exchanges to distinguish
themselves by the quality, size and number of their issuers and to create a brand
name associated with high quality Accordingly, in considering the history of cor-
porate governance listing standards, it is necessary to remain mindful that both
good governance and competitive motives continue to influence their develop-
ment and use.
1. The New York Stock Exchange
The NYSE traces its origins to 1792, when 24 brokers and merchants signed
the Buttonwood Agreement fixing commission rates on trading public stock. In
1817, 27 brokers organized themselves as the New York Stock and Exchange
Board, which later became the NYSE." In the early years of its existence, the
NYSE did not have established listing standards to determine which stocks it
would list.12 Instead, prior to the twentieth century, the standards applicable to
listed companies were flexible terms inserted in listing agreements negotiated
between each issuer and the NYSE.13 This contractual flexibility made listing stan-
9. NYSE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 102.01 (1999) [hereinafter
NYSE MANUAL]. The NYSE Manual sets forth requirements that issuers with listed equity securities
must, subject to certain exceptions have: (a) (i) 2,000 total holders of 100 shares or more, (ii) 2,200
total stockholders and an average monthly trading volume of 100,000 shares or (iii) 500 total stock-
holders, an average monthly trading volume of 1,000,000 shares and at least 1,100,000 publicly held
shares; (b) demonstrate an aggregate market value of publicly held shares of $60 million; and (c) must
meet one of three specified earnings or revenue targets. Id. Nasdaq has corresponding quantitative
requirements for issues listed. NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS MANUAL § 4300 (2000) [hereinafter NASD MANUAL].
10. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 301.00.
11. Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 113,
115 (1998).
12. Id. at 117 (observing that the "composition of the list of stocks called was apparently set
informally in the early years, as the board had no written rules governing the subject.").
13. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Se-
curities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1465 (1992).
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dards consistently subject to ad hoc enforcement and substantive alteration. 4
Moreover, new standards were not retroactively applied, permitting issuers to
avoid having their securities delisted notwithstanding their noncompliance with
standards promulgated after their original listing. During this initial period, the
NYSE had no uniform set of listing standards applicable to all listed companies.
While as a regulatory policy the lack of uniformity may have been questionable,
this flexibility allowed the NYSE to change its listing agreements to meet its eco-
nomic needs. '5
As early as 1869, the NYSE Board of Governors formed a Committee on Stock
List (Stock List Committee) to evaluate issuer applications to list securities on the
NYSE.16 The Stock List Committee was primarily concerned with the qualitative
character of the issuer and, in deciding whether to permit a certain issuer onto
the list, it considered such matters as the degree of national interest in the com-
pany, its standing in its particular field, the character of the market for its products
and its relative stability and position in the industry. Each applicant was required
to disclose information including, but not limited to, the history and nature of its
business, management, capitalization structure, stock provisions, business fin-
ancials and its accounting policies. 17
Although the activities of the Stock List Committee are the predecessors of
today's listing requirements, the application of written corporate governance stan-
dards to listed issuers did not begin until some three decades later when the NYSE
began to secure written agreements with its listed companies to provide substan-
tial financial disclosure and certain safeguards for investors.' 8 Accordingly, these
early standards were enforceable entirely as a matter of contract law. Initially, the
NYSE's primary governance concern was financial disclosure. In time, however,
the emphasis expanded to include several corporate governance listing standards.
By 1900, NYSE listing agreements included a provision requiring companies to
distribute annual reports to stockholders. 9 In 1909, the first direct corporate
governance standard, requiring an annual stockholders' meeting, was included as
a listing agreement term. This standard was eventually linked to annual reporting
requirements.20 With the abolition of the NYSE's "unlisted" department in 1910,
the NYSE began to require additional disclosure from listed corporations. In 1914,
listing agreements began to provide that a listed company must notify the NYSE
of any change in the rights of stockholders or of redemption of preferred stock.'
By 1917, listing agreements provided for the disclosure of a semiannual income
statement and balance sheet.22 By 1923, companies agreed to report their earnings
14. Id. at 1465-66.
15. CHARLES A. DICE & WILFORD J. EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 117 (2d ed. 1941).
16. See id. at 110-16; GILBERT W COOKE, THE STOCK MARKETS 215 (1964); GEORGE L. LEFFLER,
THE STOCK MARKET 414 (1951).
17. DICE & EITEMAN, supra note 15, at 111-16.
18. LEFFLER, supra note 16, at 430.
19. COOKE, supra note 16, at 216.
20. Michael, supra note 13, at 1467-68.
21. COOKE, supra note 16, at 216.
22. Id.
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quarterly.23 In 1926, the NYSE adopted a one share, one vote listing standard. 24
Corporations softened their stance on publishing financial information, and, by
1928, the NYSE established a new policy on corporate publicity 25
At approximately the same time, states began to enact statutes regulating
securities. Known as "blue sky laws,' 26 these early statutes were "extremely
restrictive, allowing few exemptions from registration, and [giving] administrative
agencies ... sweeping enforcement power."27 As the blue sky laws became in-
creasingly widespread,2 8 their constitutional validity was challenged.29 However,
in 1917, the Supreme Court held certain blue sky law provisions to be consti-
tutional, leading to the understanding that blue sky laws were, on the whole,
constitutional.30
Notwithstanding the NYSE's emphasis on financial disclosure in its early listing
agreements and the regulatory impact of blue sky regulation, after the stock
market crash of 1929 regulators began to take seriously the need for, and impor-
tance of, financial disclosure by listed companies. A new NYSE policy urged, but
did not require, companies to prepare financial reports by independent accoun-
tants and to prepare detailed income statements. 31 By 1932, independent audits
became a part of all new listing agreements and therefore mandatory for all newly
listed companies. 3
2
The vitality of the NYSE's regulation of issuers through listing requirements
was demonstrated with the passage of the Exchange Act. As one commentator
has noted, the "Congress closely tracked the NYSE disclosure requirements when
it drafted the Exchange Act. '33 Accordingly, many of the matters previously part
23. Id.
24. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 697 (1986).
25. LEFFLER, supra note 16, at 430.
26. See generally Louis Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (1976).
27. 1 HUGH L. SOWARDS & NEIL H. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY REGULATION § 1.0211] 1-4 to 1-5. (A. A.
Sommer, Jr. ed., 2002).
28. Between 1910 and 1933, the blue sky movement failed to take hold in only one state. 1 Louis
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 39 (3rd ed. 1989).
29. SOWARDS & HIRSCH, supra note 27, § 1.02121 1-5 to 1-6 (noting lower courts held the
laws unconstitutional as improper burdens on interstate commerce and as violations of the Due
Process Clause).
30. See id. § 1.0212] 1-6. In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the blue sky law provi-
sions. It held that the broad discretionary powers of state securities administrators were both within
the police power of the states and within the confines of the Due Process Clause, and it held that the
laws regulating sales of securities within a state's borders did not interfere impermissibly with interstate
commerce. See id. § 1.0212] 1-6 to 1-9 nn. 18-19 (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917);
Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W Halsey & Co., 242
U.S. 568 (1917)). Since the trilogy, the constitutionality of blue sky laws has been accepted. Id.
§ 1.02121 1-6 to 1-7 n.18 (citing SEC v. Steadman, 798 E Supp. 733, 738 (D.D.C. 1991); N. Star Int'l.
v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 E2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
28, at 39-40 (arguing "lon the whole, . . . there no longer need be any substantial constitutional
doubts about blue sky provisions that are well drafted").
31. Id.; see also COOKE, supra note 16, at 216.
32. LEFFLER, supra note 16, at 430.
33. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Secu-
rities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 1008 (1999).
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of NYSE listing agreements, including quarterly and annual reporting require-
ments, and the policies of the NYSE regarding independent audits, became a
matter of federal law 3 4
Even after the promulgation of the Exchange Act, however, the NYSE remained
concerned with the governance practices of its listed companies. Beginning in
1940, minimum voting rights were required for preferred stockholders. 35 In 1955,
the NYSE required that listed issuers obtain shareholder approval for any acqui-
sition of assets or securities from a director, officer or major shareholder or an
acquisition resulting in an increase greater than 20 percent of its outstanding
shares. 36 Then, in 1956, the NYSE required listed companies to have at least two
outside directors on their boards.
37
From the late 1950s until the 1970s, the NYSE's corporate governance listing
standards remained relatively static. In fact it was not until the 1970s that the
NYSE made a substantive addition to its corporate governance listing require-
ments when, at the SEC's encouragement, the NYSE required each of its listed
issuers to establish an audit committee comprised of independent directors.3 As
this history demonstrates, corporate governance listing standards are deeply
rooted in NYSE history
2. The American Stock Exchange
The New York Curb Market (Curb), which later became the Amex, was formed
in 1860.39 From the time of the Curb's establishment, issuers seeking to avoid
the NYSE's more stringent disclosure requirements would trade as an "unlisted"
security on the Curb, making the Curb a springboard for many smaller and less
established issuers to enter the market.4" In this role as a seasoner for the NYSE,
the Curb listed those securities which could not meet the NYSE's strict listing
requirements. Accordingly, for much of its history, the Amex's listing standards
have been significantly more lenient than corresponding NYSE standards. One
possible explanation for the differences between the NYSE and the Amex listing
standards lies in the Amex's historic role as a competitor for NYSE listings.
Because of its desire to maintain a competitive position as the less demanding
exchange, the Amex has been forced repeatedly to defend itself from charges that
its less stringent requirements harmed investors. In 1933, for example, the New
York State Attorney General launched an investigation of the Amex after receiving
34. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25), (26) (2000) [hereinafter Securities Act].
35. LEFFLER, supra note 16, at 432.
36. Michael, supra note 13, at 1469.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1470.
39. See ABOUT AMEX HISTORY, INTERAcTIVE TIMELINE, available at http://www.amex.com/atamex/
aboutAmex/history/aboutAmex historyhtml (last visited June 15, 2002).
40. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 220. Those exchanges which permitted securities to
be traded on an "unlisted" basis were those who campaigned most against the abolishment of unlisted
trading. Whereas the NYSE abolished its unlisted trading department in 1910, Amex was steadfast in
retaining its unlisted securities and only took its first steps toward dismantlement in 1934. Michael,
supra note 13, at 1472.
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complaints about the laxity of the Amex's listing practices.4' The Attorney General
called for the elimination of unlisted trading because of the widespread belief
among investors "that all securities traded on [the Amex] conform to the standards
for listed securities" of the NYSE.42 In his opinion, allowing unlisted trading "pre-
sents an opportunity for serious abuses."43 For example, the Amex had allowed
trading in unlisted companies' stock to continue even when it knew the companies
had become insolvent or bankrupt. 44 As a result of the investigation, the Amex
took some measures of reform, removing some stocks from trading and requiring
enhanced disclosure regarding unlisted stocks.4 Given the limited availability of
enforcement resources, the Attorney General was forced to end the investigation.
46
During the 1960s, however, additional scandals led to reform of the Amex. In
1962, following several scandals, the SEC issued a report criticizing almost every
aspect of the Amex's operations, including its methods of stock listing.47 In sum,
the SEC concluded that the Amex failed at achieving any type of self-regulation.
After this rebuke, the Amex began to initiate several reforms regarding its orga-
nization and listing standards.48 For example, beginning in 1964, the Amex pro-
mulgated listing standards that required proxy solicitations and shareholder ap-
proval of certain transactions. In 1968, the Amex published its first edition of the
American Stock Exchange Company Guide, which included various listing stan-
dards and policies regarding conflicts of interest, directors, quorums and voting
rights.49 Conflicts of interest between shareholders and related parties, such as
officers, directors or substantial shareholders, were considered on a case-by-case
basis.50 The size and significance of the conflict as well as its possible resolution
were also taken into consideration. Although not required, the Amex policy rec-
ommended the appointment of at least two independent directors, a factor also
considered when evaluating the significance of a conflict of interest. 51 Except in
the areas of voting rights and independent audit committee members, the Amex
listings standards have remained relatively static since the 1970s.
Until 1976, the Amex did not have an official policy concerning voting rights.
In 1972, the Amex's stated policy was to prohibit all issues of nonvoting common
stock, but its practice was to consider each case on an individual basis. Further,
on several occasions, the Amex did not refuse to list companies with disparate
41. ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 1921-1971, at 99 (1972);
see also, 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 2770.
42. SOBEL, supra note 41, at 99.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 100.
45. Id. at 102. According to Loss and Seligman, the investigation led to the removal of almost,
1,000 unlisted issues. See 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 2770.
46. See SOBEL, supra note 41, at 102. Even after the investigation, the Amex continued to allow
trading of unlisted issues and remained the "great unlisted market of the country." 6 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 28, at 2770.
47. SOBEL, supra note 41, at 293-94.
48. Michael, supra note 13, at 1473.
49. Id. at 1473 n.78.
50. AMEX, CONSTITUTION AND RULES, LISTING STANDARDS, POLICIES AND REQUIREMENTS § 120
(2000) [hereinafter AMEX LISTING STANDARDS].
51. Id. § 121.
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voting rights for its shareholders. 52 In particular, as described in the following
section, the Amex's 1976 decision to list Wang Laboratories, Inc. (Wang) even
though it had been rejected for listing by the NYSE because of unequal share-
holder voting rights, evidenced a willingness to list issuers which did not have a
one share, one vote common stock capitalization which ultimately provided im-
petus to a change in the voting rights listing standard of all exchanges.
Similarly, the Amex's independent audit committee standards had been char-
acterized as being "less exacting" than those of the NYSE. 53 Following the rec-
ommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees 54 (Blue Ribbon Committee), more stringent stan-
dards with respect to the independence of audit committees and the financial
literacy of directors were mandated.
3. The Nasdaq Stock Market
The predecessor to Nasdaq was formed in 1971 by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) to increase the efficiency in the over-the-counter
(OTC) market for unlisted securities. As a quotation service rather than a securities
exchange, Nasdaq historically had not "listed" securities. Instead Nasdaq securities
are included for quotation on its system. Although a legal technicality rooted in
the Exchange Act, this difference was of great importance to Nasdaq. As a quo-
tation service operated by a "registered securities association," rather than a reg-
istered "national securities exchange," Nasdaq was unable, until the 1980s, to
obtain exemptions from blue sky laws for the securities it quoted.5" Although
some states do provide an exemption for certain OTC securities,'56 the haphazard
application of state blue sky exemptions was not sufficient for Nasdaq. As a result,
Nasdaq unsuccessfully sought federal preemption of state blue sky laws for its
quoted securities to compete with the NYSE and the Amex. One of the require-
ments of obtaining this preemption was the establishment of listing requirements.
Accordingly, the history of Nasdaq listing requirements is rooted in state blue
sky laws.57
In 1985, Nasdaq initiated its first corporate governance listing standards in an
effort to secure blue sky exemptions in a greater number of states."8 These stan-
dards included the submission of annual and periodic reports to shareholders,
52. 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 1839 n.302.
53. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 758-59; cf. American Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 16,722, 1980 SEC LEXIS 1732 (Apr. 3, 1980).
54. BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMS., REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COR-
PORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999), reprinted in 54 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1999) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON
COMM. REPORT].
55. Although the blue sky laws vary from state to state, each contains a registration requirement
with respect to securities to be sold in the state.
56. AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON MERIT REGULATION OF THE STATE REGULATION OF SEC. COMM., REPORT
ON STATE MERIT REGULATION OF SECURITIES OFFERINGS, reprinted in 41 Bus. LAw. 785, 796 (1986).
57. Id. at 835.
58. Michael, supra note 13, at 1475; Seligman, supra note 24, at 705.
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the appointment of independent directors, an independent audit committee, re-
quired shareholder participation in certain corporate transactions and the exe-
cution of a listing agreement.
5 9
The extent to which Nasdaq-quoted securities would be exempt from state law
registration requirements was ultimately settled by the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996,60 which preempted state regulation of the securities
registration and offering process with respect to "covered securities" which are
"nationally tracked securities" or securities listed on the NYSE, the Amex, another
national securities exchange or Nasdaq.61
B. THE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS PROCESS
Listing arrangements between an issuer and an exchange are the subject of a
private contract. Nevertheless, in recent years with the increased importance of
corporate governance, certain governance listing standards have been the subject
of public discussion with participation by the exchanges, the SEC, issuers, inves-
tors and other interested parties. In addition, the SEC has adopted a practice of
encouraging exchanges "voluntarily" to adopt given corporate governance listing
standards and in the process has urged the exchanges, listed companies and share-
holders to reach consensus on those standards. This mode of activity has been
called "regulation by raised eyebrow."62 The process is exemplified by initiatives
involving voting rights, independent audit committees and the current debate
over a broad-based option listing standard.
1. One Share, One Vote
The origins of the one share, one vote listing standard are rooted in a 1926
NYSE requirement that the voting rights of common stockholders should not be
restricted and all shares of common stock of a listed company should have one
vote.63 During the 1920s, dual class issuances were motivated by the desire to
raise additional equity capital and simultaneously retain control in the hands of
a founding family or entrepreneurial group. The NYSE, however, was skeptical of
listing nonvoting common stock. Disparate voting rights were seen as adverse to
notions of investor protection because those who had contributed the most capital
often were given the least amount of voting power. However, in 1926 the NYSE
decided to list Dodge Brothers, Inc. despite the disproportionate amount of non-
voting common stock in relation to its voting common stock. This decision re-
sulted in much public criticism. The NYSE responded to this criticism by stating:
"Without at this time attempting to formulate a definite policy, attention should
be drawn to the fact that in the future the committee [on listings], in considering
59. Michael, supra note 13, at 1475.
60. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat 3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)-(b)
(2000)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2000).
62. Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984).
63. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 308.00.
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applications for the listing of securities, will give careful thought to the matter of
voting control."64 The NYSE enforced this listing policy for more than a half
century thereafter.
Until 1976, the Amex followed a similar policy limiting disparate voting rights.
In that year, however, the Amex decided to break with this prior policy and list
Wang which had been rejected for listing by the NYSE because of its unequal
shareholder voting rights. After 1976, listings on the Amex were required to meet
the so-called "Wang Formula" which permitted multiple class structures that sat-
isfied the following criteria: (i) disparate voting rights between shareholder classes
is not greater than a 10 to 1 ratio; (ii) "the low-vote class has the exclusive right
to elect at least [25 percent] of the Board"; and (iii) in the event the high-vote
class represents less than 12.5 percent of the equity, "the low-vote shares have the
right to vote in the election of the [75 percent] of the Board that they do not elect
directly" 65 The willingness by the Amex to list issuers that met the Wang Formula
posed a competitive challenge to the NYSE with respect to new listings.
Although the NYSE initially did not seek to eliminate its more rigorous voting
rights standard, the hostile takeover boom of the 1980s forced the NYSE to re-
consider its position. Specifically, during the 1980s, many NYSE listed issuers
sought to engage in defensive recapitalizations to ensure that insiders obtained
shares with greater voting rights than public shareholders. Given Amex's use of
the Wang Formula and Nasdaq's allowance of unequal voting shares in this new
environment, the NYSE proved unable to resist this competition.
66
General Motors Corporation (GM) provided the catalyst for the NYSE's reex-
amination of dual class voting shares when it issued a class of lesser weighted
voting shares in connection with its 1984 acquisition of Electronic Data Systems,
Inc. (EDS). After acquiring EDS, GM refused to comply with the NYSE one share,
one vote rule, threatening to list with Amex or Nasdaq. Forced to choose between
its one share, one vote rule and GM, the NYSE ignored the rule and permitted
GM to remain listed. With the continued listing of GM, the NYSE announced in
June 1984 a moratorium on delisting based on dual class capitalizations. Two
years later, in 1986, the NYSE officially modified its "long-standing rule mandating
a one share, one vote standard for all common stocks listed on the NYSE."67 As
a result, by mid-1988, 55 NYSE listed issuers did not adhere to the one share,
one vote rule.
68
Faced with these developments, the SEC held public hearings to determine
whether section 19(c) of the Exchange Act would allow it to impose a uniform
64. Seligman, supra note 24, at 697.
65. AMEX, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF Gov-
ERNORS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 4 (1991) (emphasis omitted); see also Seligman supra note
24, at 704.
66. See Study Predicts NYSE Will Permit Dual Classes of Stock with Unequal Voting Rights, DAILY REPORT
FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 21, at A2 (Jan. 31, 1986).
67. Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 25,891,
53 Fed. Reg. 26,376, 26,379 (July 12, 1988).
68. Id. at 26,376; see also Nathaniel C. Nash, Big Board Defends Plan on Two Classes of Shares, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1986, at Dl.
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voting rights rule on the NYSE and other SROs.69 Following the hearings, the SEC
arranged meetings with the staffs of the NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq. The ob-
jective of these meetings was to reach consensus on a uniform rule restricting
shareholder disenfranchisement by companies listed on the NYSE, the Amex and
Nasdaq. 70 By advancing a uniform rule, the SEC reasoned, it could prevent the
markets from underbidding each other with respect to corporate governance mat-
ters-thus avoiding a feared "race to the bottom."71
When its efforts to forge consensus failed, the SEC initiated formal proceedings
under section 19(c) and adopted Rule 19c-4. 72 This new rule, which applied
uniformly to each exchange and Nasdaq, provided that no equity security would
be listed if the issuer of that security took any corporate action with the effect of
"nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per share voting rights" of
holders of an outstanding class or classes of common stock.73 Although Rule
19c-4 appeared to resolve the question of a one share, one vote listing standard,
the SEC's victory was short-lived. On June 12, 1990, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated Rule 19c-4 in Business Roundtable, holding that the SEC's use of
section 19(c) under the Exchange Act to impose a one share, one vote listing
standard exceeded its authority7
Following its defeat in the Business Roundtable decision, the SEC continued to
press for a uniform voting rights policy, albeit through informal means. "After
much negotiation with the SEC, [first] the NYSE[,] and [later] Nasdaq[,] adopted
a uniform rule that was a ... modified version of former SEC Rule 19c-4."7 15 The
NYSE policy prohibited any restriction or disparate reduction in the voting rights
of the common stock of public shareholders through any corporate action. In
view of changes in the marketplace, the NYSE emphasized the flexibility of the
new policy by underscoring its aim to permit those corporate actions previously
permitted under Rule 19c-4. As such, the policy did permit disparate voting rights
and the listing of nonvoting common stock as long the stockholders were afforded
certain safeguards which seek to align (as much as possible) the rights of non-
voting shareholders with voting shareholders. Minimum voting rights were also
required for preferred stockholders. Notwithstanding this flexibility, the NYSE rule
was perceived as precluding a race to the bottom with respect to a shareholder
voting rights policy
69. 4 Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 28, at 1840-41.
70. See id.
71. For more on the SEC's initial efforts in the "one share, one vote" controversy, see Seligman,
supra note 24.
72. Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. at 26,376; see also
Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement, Exchange Act Release No. 24,623, 52 Fed. Reg.
23,665 (June 24, 1987) (proposing Rule 19c-4 under the Exchange Act and summarizing the history
of SRO action with respect to the one share, one vote concept).
73. Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. at 26,376. Although
Rule 19c-4 embodied a broad standard, it was quite detailed in applying the standard to a wide variety
of actions and transactions.
74. This decision is discussed infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
75. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REv.
325, 346 (2001).
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The Amex, however, rejected the SEC's overtures and instead approved a plan
to allow its listed companies to create multiple classes of stock with unequal voting
rights subject to certain safeguards. Fearing that the Amex's refusal to adopt the
uniform standard would cause the NYSE and Nasdaq to abandon their recently
adopted rules, the SEC redoubled its efforts to achieve consensus. 76 Two SEC
commissioners sent a letter urging the Amex board to adopt the favored standard.
The then-chairman of the SEC testified before a congressional committee, sug-
gesting that the Congress "'consider identifying minimum federal protections for
voting rights in any publicly traded corporation or partnership.' 77
When, three years later, this issue remained unresolved, the SEC enlisted the
support of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an organization of large
public pension and other funds, which had made a one share, one vote policy
the first tenet of its Shareholder Bill of Rights. 78 The CII and several large insti-
tutional investors (including the California Public Employees Retirement System
or CaIPERS) discussed the issue at length and submitted detailed comments to
the exchanges. Prodded by investors and then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, the
NYSE, Nasdaq and the Amex finally agreed to a uniform voting rights standard
in 1994.79 The agreed-upon standard, which was essentially a modified (but more
flexible) version of the vacated Rule 19c-4, reflected "the recognition by the trad-
ing markets and the shareholder and business communities of the need to achieve
a consensual and balanced resolution of issues relative to shareholder disenfran-
chisement."80 It also represented an important victory for the SEC after the Business
Roundtable decision and further entrenched listing standards as an institutional
mechanism for selective matters of corporate governance. Moreover, the estab-
lishment of uniform voting rights policies demonstrated the efficacy of the forum
process, even after the SEC's authority to use section 19(c) to impose corporate
governance standards had been restricted by Business Roundtable.
2. Audit Committees
The promulgation of the independent audit committee standard provides the
most recent example of the forum approach leading to a corporate governance
listing standard. Although since the 1940s the SEC recommended that public
companies form audit committees comprised of independent directors,8' the
SEC did not attempt to require public companies to have independent audit
committees until the 1970s. During this period, widespread scandals concerning
76. See Amy L. Goodman, One Share/One Vote... Again, INSIGHTS, June 1991, at 2.
77. Id. (quoting congressional testimony by then SEC Chairman Breeden).
78. See The IRRC Monitor Uniform Voting Rights Standard Within Reach, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE AD-
VISOR, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 36.
79. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 35,121, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,570,
66,570 (Dec. 19, 1994).
80. Robert Todd Lang, Shareholder Voting Rights-The New Uniform Listing Standard, INSIGHTS, Feb.
1995, at 4.
81. See McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Accounting Series Release No. 19, Exchange Act Release
No. 2707, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,020, at 62,104, 62,108 (Dec.
5, 1940).
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questionable or illegal payments to domestic and foreign government officials
uncovered inadequate or improper corporate accounting and recordkeeping prac-
tices.82 In its report investigating these scandals, the SEC pointed to, among other
things, the importance of audit committees in uncovering the falsification of cor-
porate records and the use of "slush" funds and endorsed oversight by audit
committees as an appropriate governance institution.8 3
As a result, the SEC urged that the independence and vitality of corporate
boards of directors be strengthened and suggested, in a letter to the then-
Chairman of the NYSE, that the NYSE revise its listing requirements to provide a
practical means of effecting the SEC's objectives without increasing direct gov-
ernmental regulation.
The NYSE agreed and on March 9, 1977 the SEC approved a new NYSE rule
requiring all listed domestic companies to establish and maintain "an audit com-
mittee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from
any relationship that ... would interfere with the exercise of independent judg-
ment as a committee member. ''8 4 In addition, the NYSE rule required that a ma-
jority of the audit committee be comprised of directors who were not formerly
officers of the issuer or its subsidiaries.8 5 Shortly thereafter, the Amex and Nasdaq
promulgated listing standards related to audit committees.86
Over the next two decades, shareholder activists increasingly argued that not
only the audit committees, but also the boards of directors of public companies,
should be comprised primarily of persons independent of management. As a
result, a steady stream of reports and recommendations by blue ribbon commit-
tees and distinguished business and legal bodies argued in support of independent
directors.8 7 This movement was significantly boosted by a 1998 speech at the
New York University Center for Law and Business by then SEC Chairman Levitt
expressing growing concern about modern earnings management practices.8 ' "The
most reliable guardians of the public interest" in this area, the Chairman argued,
were "qualified, committed, independent and tough-minded audit committees."8 9
82. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL COR-
PORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) (submitted to the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.), reprinted in 353 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Special
Supplement No. 353, at 2 (May 19, 1976).
83. See id. at 2, 6-8.
84. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release
No. 13,346, 1977 SEC LEXIS 2252, at *1 (Mar. 9, 1977).
85. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 303.01(B)(2)(a), (B)(3)(a).
86. The Amex and Nasdaq standards were less stringent than the NYSE standard requiring only
that a majority of the audit committee members be independent. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 & cmt. a (1992).
87. See, e.g., BLUE RIBBON COMM. REPORT, supra note 54; THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1997), available at htp://www.brtable.org/document.cfm.11 (last ac-
cessed June 11, 2002); ABA Section of Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994 Edition, 49
Bus. LAw. 1243 (1994).
88. Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., The "Numbers Game," Re-
marks at the N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (last accessed June 11, 2002).
89. Id.
1508 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 57, August 2002
Chairman Levitt indicated that the SEC stood ready to take action to protect the
public interest, but that a private sector response (obviating the need for public
sector mandates) seemed wiser.90 The Chairman then announced that, at the SEC's
request, the NYSE and the Nasdaq had agreed to sponsor a blue ribbon panel "to
make recommendations on strengthening the role of audit committees in over-
seeing the corporate financial reporting process." 91 The panel would be drawn
from the various constituencies of the financial community, and its recommen-
dations could include changes to exchange-listing standards, amendments to au-
diting standards, new SEC corporate disclosure requirements and a formulation
of best practices.
The Blue Ribbon Committee was a complex, private-sector collaborative effort.
The Blue Ribbon Committee held a public hearing that included testimony and
written comments from various interested parties.92 The Blue Ribbon Committee
"canvassed its members, all of whom [actively participated] in the private sector,"
and consulted a number of prior works and reports on the topic of audit com-
mittees.93 After reviewing public comments and suggestions, the Blue Ribbon
Committee released a 71-page report of integrated audit committee recommen-
dations just a few months after having been formed. 94
Included in the Blue Ribbon Committee report were recommendations to the
NYSE and Nasdaq to revise the definition of "independent director," require in-
dependent audit committees, mandate minimum audit committee size and in-
creased financial literacy, clarify audit committee oversight for outside auditors
and require written audit committee charters. 95 Also included were suggestions
addressed to the SEC and the accounting profession. In releasing the report, the
committee's co-chairman, John Whitehead, stated that the committee viewed its
recommendations as "an integrated set of objectives" intended to encourage "ef-
fective interrelationships among relevant corporate participants. '" 96
Less than one year after the Blue Ribbon Committee released its report, sub-
stantially all of its recommendations-with a few significant modifications-were
proposed by the NYSE, Nasdaq and the Amex and subsequently approved and
adopted by the SEC under section 19(b).9 7 The forum approach to corporate
90. Id.
91. See Press Release, SEC News Release No. 98-96, SEC, NYSE and NASD Announce Blue Ribbon
Panel to Improve Corporate Audit Committees (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/pressarchive/1998/98-96.txt.
92. See BLUE RIBBON COMM. REPORT, supra note 54, at 1068.
93. See Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1058 (1999).
94. See Press Release, NYSE, NASD & Blue Ribbon Comm., NYSE Chair Richard Grasso, NASD
Chair Frank Zarb, and Blue Ribbon Panel Co-Chairs Ira Millstein and John Whitehead Announce "Ten
Point Plan" To Improve Oversight of Financial Reporting Process (Feb. 8, 1999), available at http://
nyse.com/press/NT0000A71A.html.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Gerald S. Backman, Audit Committees: The Proposed Regulations, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE AD-
VISOR, Nov/Dec. 1999, at 7; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 42,231,
64 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (Dec. 14, 1999) (approving Nasdaq rule change); Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,232, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,518 (Dec. 14, 1999) (approving Amex rule change);
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governance rulemaking, exemplified by "broad-based dialogue ... between [the
SEC], academia, the legal community, and issuers,"98 had, with the support of the
SEC, prevailed over the process of unilateral action by the SEC.
3. Broad-Based Option Plans
The continuing attempts to encourage the exchanges to adopt a listing standard
requiring shareholder approval of broad-based option plans represents a third
instance in which the listing standard was the subject of what evolved into a
collaborative corporate governance forum. Traditionally, shareholder approval was
required for any stock option plan under which a listed company's officers may
receive stock options or awards, subject to an exception for "broad-based" plans
that include both officers and non-officer employees. 9
In 1998, the NYSE proposed codifying its prior interpretations defining the
term "broad-based" which was approved by the SEC in that year. Although the
SEC published the proposal for comment before acting on the NYSE proposal,
after its adoption representatives of some major institutional investors claimed to
be unaware of the proposal.100 Moreover, several large institutional investors urged
the NYSE to "correct" the new rule by addressing cumulative dilution concerns,
tightening the participation and nondiscrimination concepts and making the SEC
approval process more public.'10 Responding to these complaints, the NYSE is-
sued a broadly disseminated "white paper" requesting additional comments. The
NYSE also created a special task force (with equal representation from issuer and
shareholder constituencies) to review the comments and make recommenda-
tions. 02 The special task force's recommendations included a narrower definition
of "broad-based" which was subsequently approved by the SEC on a temporary
basis. 0 3 As of this writing, the temporary standard has been extended and remains
in effect at the NYSE. Moreover, it is generally followed by Nasdaq as an unofficial
interpretation of its broad-based plan exception. 10 4
The NYSE special task force also recommended that the NYSE "set an overall
dilution maximum" for certain other stock option plans.10 5 When an expanded
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 42,233, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 14, 1999)
(approving NYSE rule change).
98. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., An Essential Next Step in the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance, Address at the Audit Committee Symposium (June 29,1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch289.htm.
99. See id. Although there are other limited exceptions to the shareholder approval requirements,
the broad-based plan exception is the most controversial and widely used.
100. See Council of Institutional Investors Letter (Peg O'Hara ed., Vol. 2, No. 15) (Apr. 24, 1998).
101. Id.
102. See Council of Institutional Investors Letter (Peg O'Hara ed., Vol. 2, No. 18) (May 13, 1998).
103. See id.
104. In a recent letter to the SEC, Nasdaq stated that it is considering whether "all stock option
plans benefiting officers or directors should be approved by shareholders." Letter from Hardwick
Simmons, Chaiman and Chief Executive Officer, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., to The Honorable
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 5 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/.
105. NYSE, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON STOCKHOLDER
APPROVAL POLICY 3 (Oct. 28, 1999).
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task force addressed an overall dilution maximum, it recommended that the NYSE
abandon its newly-adopted broad-based plan exemption and adopt a relative
(rather than absolute) dilution threshold.'0 ° More importantly, the task force also
cautioned the NYSE against adopting any overall dilution standard before similar
standards were approved by Nasdaq and the Amex advocating market coordi-
nation "because, with regard to corporate governance, the leading securities mar-
kets should seek to harmonize their rules in the best interests of investors, not to
compete on the basis of disparities in their rules."'1
0 7
By November 2000 the exchanges had not reached consensus, and the SEC
called for a collaborative resolution of the issue. Then SEC Chairman Levitt urged
the markets "to restore promptly the rightful balance between shareholder and
management interests by requiring shareholder approval for all plans that grant
options or award stock to officers and directors" and announced that the SEC
would move forward on a rule to require companies to disclose all option grants
that dilute existing shareholders' interests. 08 Soon thereafter, the NYSE and Nas-
daq began soliciting comments from their listed issuers on an overall dilution
standard for stock option plans. 0 9 To date, however, the issue remains unresolved,
causing the newly appointed SEC Chairman, Harvey Pitt, to note publicly, "We
will have to make it clear ... that although it was a request, it was expected to
be implemented. They should move with alacrity" ' 10 More recently, Chairman Pitt
explained five components of options that should be emphasized to align man-
agement and shareholder interests."' Nasdaq has since stated its support for
shareholder approval of stock option plans that benefit officers and directors. 112
C. CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS
1. Domestic Issuers
Summarized below are the corporate governance listing standards set forth in
the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (NYSE Manual) and the
National Association of Securities Dealers Manual (NASD Manual) and Notices to
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 18.
108. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., Remarks at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Securities In-
dustry Association (Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch420.htm.
109. Letter from Catherine R. Kinney, Group Executive Vice President, Competitive Position Group,
NYSE, to Corporate Secretaries of Listed Companies (Dec. 20, 2000), available at http://www.nyse.coml
pdfs/policypdf.
110. Vicky Stamas, Options-Disclosure Rule OK'd: SEC Requires Firms To Tell Shareholders More About
Stock Offered to Workers in Compensation Plans, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 20, 2001, at C4.
111. SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Inaugural Lecture of the JD/MBA Lecture Series,
Kellogg Graduate School of Management and Northwestern Law School (Apr. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch547.htm. The five components are: (i) shareholder approval of
stock option plans; (ii) a committee of independent directors to make any decisions to grant options
to senior management; (iii) corporate boards should focus on long-term growth as a prerequisite to
the exercise of options; (iv) chief executive officers of issuers should be prepared to certify to share-
holders that all relevant information has been disclosed; and (v) "[a]udit committee members should
question and test the disclosure and financial reporting process." Id.
112. Letter from Hardwick Simmons, supra note 104.
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Members. 1 3 Six of the corporate governance listing standards are required by
both the NYSE and Nasdaq. The others are solely those of the NYSE.1 4
(i) Audit Committees. Companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq must
have a qualified audit committee established by a formal written charter.
The committee must ensure that the outside auditors provide a statement
describing all relationships between the auditor and the company Under
both NYSE and Nasdaq rules, audit committees must be comprised of at
least three financially literate "independent" directors. The NYSE requires
at least one audit committee member to have accounting or related fi-
nancial management expertise. "5 Nasdaq requires at least one audit com-
mittee member to have past employment experience in finance, account-
ing or a comparable field. 1 6 Both the NYSE and Nasdaq permit a board
of directors to waive certain independence requirements with respect to
a single audit committee member under exceptional circumstances, pro-
vided such waiver is disclosed in the issuer's next annual proxy statement.
(ii) Shareholder Approval. The NYSE requires shareholder approval prior
to (i) any issuance of 20 percent or more of common stock or voting
power outstanding before the issuance, other than in a public offering for
cash or in certain bona fide private financings; or (ii) certain issuances of
common stock to specified related parties." 7 The NYSE also provides that
when shareholder approval is required prior to the listing of new or ad-
ditional shares, the total vote cast must represent over 50 percent in
interest of all securities entitled to vote on the proposal." 8 Nasdaq re-
quires shareholder approval prior to (i) the acquisition of stock or assets
of another company if either (a) any director, officer or substantial share-
holder of the issuer has a substantial interest in the target company and
the acquisition could result in an issuance that increases the common
stock or voting power of the issuer by 5 percent or more, or (b) such
acquisition will result in an issuance of 20 percent or more of common
stock or voting power outstanding before the issuance; or (ii) any sale,
issuance or potential issuance of common stock, other than in a public
113. In addition to the corporate governance listing standards set forth below, NYSE rules also
include provisions: (i) requiring the public disclosure of material events and periodic financial infor-
mation and (ii) establishing procedural requirements with respect to notice of shareholders' meetings
and soliciting proxies from shareholders. These requirements both overlap and supplement similar
requirements in the Exchange Act. See generally NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, §§ 2 (Disclosure and
Reporting Material Information), 4 (Shareholders' Meetings and Proxies); see also NASD MANUAL, supra
note 9, § 4350(b) (Distribution of Annual and Interim Reports).
114. The Amex has qualitative listing standards that are substantially similar to those of the NYSE
and Nasdaq as follows: audit committees (§ 12 1(B)), shareholder approval (§§ 710-713), voting rights
(§§ 122, 124), annual meetings (§ 704), quorums (§ 123), redemptions (§§ 1001, 1003), related party
transactions (§ 120) and consents (§ 706). AMEX LISTING STANDARDS, supra note 50; NASD MANUAL,
supra note 9.
115. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 303.01(B)(2)(c).
116. NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(d)(2)(A).
117. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 312.03(b), (c).
118. Id. § 312.07.
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offering, at a price lower than the book or market value for such stock,
constituting (together with certain selling shareholders, if any) 20 percent
or more of the common stock or voting power outstanding before the
issuance. 119 In addition, both the NYSE 20 and Nasdaq12' require listed
companies to obtain shareholder approval prior to (i) the adoption of
certain stock option or purchase plans (subject to exceptions, e.g., "broad-
based" plans); or (ii) any issuance that results in a change of control of
the issuer.
(iii) Voting Rights. Subject to certain exceptions, both the NYSE and Nasdaq
restrict listed companies from disparately reducing or restricting, through
any corporate action or issuance, the "[vioting rights of existing share-
holders of publicly traded common stock registered under Section 12 of
the Exchange Act."'122 The NYSE also requires certain safeguards for non-
voting common stock and preferred stock (e.g., an annual report sub-
mitted to shareholders, preferred stockholders have the right to elect
directors upon dividend default and preferred stockholders have mini-
mum voting rights).
(iv) Special Rights of Certain Shareholders. The NYSE provides that listed
companies should not grant special rights to a shareholder or group of
shareholders to the exclusion of the rest of the class of shareholders, just
as such companies should not limit the rights of shareholders. 123
(v) Annual Meetings. Companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq must hold
annual shareholder meetings. 124
(vi) Classified Board of Directors. The NYSE Manual provides that a listed
company may have a classified board of directors, provided the directors
are not divided into more than three classes. If there are classes, they
should consist "of approximately equal size and tenure and directors'
terms of office should not exceed three years."'
' 25
(vii) Defensive Tactics. The NYSE Manual provides that defensive tactics that
would discriminate among shareholders should be avoided. 26
(viii) Insider Stock Purchases. The NYSE Manual provides that when direc-
tors and officers (and their families and close associates) purchase or sell
company shares or participate in stock option or employee stock purchase
plans, they must avoid the use of inside knowledge and, "be guided by
a sense of fairness to all segments of the investing public."' 27
(ix) Quorums. Companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq must meet quo-
rum requirements for common stockholders. For NYSE-listed companies,
119. NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(i)(1)(C), (D).
120. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 312.03(a), (d).
121. NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(i)(1).
122. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 313.00; NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4351.
123. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 314.00.
124. Id. § 302.00; NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(e).
125. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 304.00.
126. Id. § 308.00.
127. Id. § 309.00.
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the quorum required for any meeting of common stockholders must be
"sufficiently high to insure a representative vote."128 A company listed on
Nasdaq must provide for a quorum as specified in its bylaws for any
meeting of common stockholders, provided, however, that in no case may
a quorum be less than 33% of the outstanding shares of the company's
voting common stock. 2 9 The NYSE Manual provides that when preferred
stockholders, voting as a class, have the right to elect directors when
dividends are in default, the NYSE "considers it preferable" that the re-
quired quorum for the election of directors by preferred stockholders be
equal to or lower than that applicable to common stock. 130
(x) Redemptions and Tender Offers. The NYSE Manual provides that listed
companies promptly notify the NYSE with specified information upon
taking any action that will result in the full or partial redemption of a
listed security. A full call results in trading suspension, whereas a partial
call results in the amount of securities authorized to be listed being re-
duced by the amount redeemed. Additionally, the NYSE may give notice
of redemption over its ticker system and issue rulings as to further deal-
ings in the security Tender offers must be carried out in accordance with
specified conditions and be designed to allow all shareholders the op-
portunity to participate on equal terms when their rights or benefits may
be affected.13'
(xi) Related Party Transactions. Companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq
are expected to conduct appropriate reviews of all related party transac-
tions. Both exchanges suggest that audit committees may be best suited
to review potential conflicts of interest. Listed companies must confirm
that they will appropriately review and evaluate related party transactions
on an ongoing basis. 32
(xii) Consents. The NYSE Manual provides that listed companies may use
consents "in lieu of special meetings [of shareholders] as proper author-
ization for shareholder approval of corporate action ... under certain
circumstances" and subject to the NYSE's review on an individual basis. 13
Notwithstanding their importance, these corporate governance listing stan-
dards address only selectively matters of state corporate law. Audit committees
are authorized by state law whereas the listing standard mandates them because
of accounting and market considerations. Shareholder approval is probably the
most significant of these standards in that there are a number of instances where
128. Id. § 310.00(A).
129. NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(f).
130. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 310.00(B).
131. ld. § 311.03.
132. Id. § 307.00; NASD MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4350(h).
133. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 306.00. The NYSE has recently filed with the SEC a proposed
rule change which would permit listed issuers to obtain shareholder approval or consent in any
manner consistent with applicable state law and the federal securities laws (on file with the Special
Study Group).
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corporate action will require such approval when it is not required under state
law. Voting rights are consistent with state law, but are included in the standards
for the purpose of investor protection. Most of the other governance standards
do not impact the overall preeminence of state corporate law. Annual meetings
are required by state law and a classified board of directors is generally consistent
with the state corporate law standard.134 The other standards establish various
means of investor protection but do not require specific action. While corporate
governance listing standards may overlap state corporate law, at the present time
they generally do not impose substantial additional obligations on issuers. No-
tably, current governance listing standards do not in the aggregate constitute a
comprehensive addition to state corporate law.
2. Foreign Issuers
Under each of the NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq rules, foreign issuers can easily
obtain an exemption from corporate governance listing requirements. Specifically,
foreign issuers can obtain a waiver from many NYSE corporate governance re-
quirements if an independent counsel licensed in the issuer's home country opines
that the issuer's governance practices are not prohibited in its domicile jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, in effect, if the laws in the issuer's home country are silent or do
not explicitly require standards analogous to a given NYSE listing standard, the
foreign issuer is permitted to obtain a waiver from the requirements of that stan-
dard.135 Under the Amex and Nasdaq listing rules, similar exemptions are avail-
able. Although historically the NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq policy was to apply
financial reporting and corporate governance requirements to foreign issuers, in
1987 the SEC approved rule changes that permitted the exchanges to waive or
modify certain listing standards for foreign issuers on a case-by-case basis. 136 The
standards that may be waived or modified in accordance with this provision are:
(i) quarterly reporting of interim earnings; (ii) composition and election of the
board of directors; (iii) shareholder approval requirements and voting rights; and
(iv) quorum requirements for shareholder meetings. Accordingly, a foreign issuer's
compliance with the "laws, customs, and practices" of its country of origin became
the operative governance standards for a U.S. listing. The more flexible, and at
times more relaxed, attitude toward listing standards applicable to foreign issuers
is based in part on a recognition of the differences between the corporate gover-
nance practices of foreign and U.S. companies and the competitive advantages of
the domestic listing of major international corporations.
An additional impetus for these changes, however, was global competition
among exchanges. The relaxation of requirements applicable to foreign issuers
134. For example, Delaware General Corporation Law permits Delaware corporations to have no
more than three classes of directors of equal size. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(d) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
135. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 103.00.
136. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. To Amend the Exchanges' Listing Stan-
dards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230, 24,230
(June 29, 1987).
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was also an SEC response to the needs of the U.S. stock exchanges and their
investment banking members to develop a U.S. market for foreign securities.
Specifically, they argued that differences between the corporate governance prac-
tices of foreign issuers and the corporate governance requirements of the U.S.
exchanges would unduly inhibit those companies from listing on U.S. exchanges.
Accordingly, the SEC was convinced that the special treatment of foreign issuers
was warranted.
3. Enforcement
As the preceding discussion makes clear, competitive pressures and the poten-
tial for defections by high-profile companies have often made the exchanges "un-
certain champions of reform" in controversial areas.137 SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
has acknowledged that historically persuading an individual exchange to move
forward with unpopular reforms is difficult, given that both the NYSE and Nasdaq
are "reluctant to go first for fear of giving the other a competitive advantage in
attracting companies to become listed.' ' 38
To the extent governance listing standards are a matter of private contract be-
tween an issuer and the exchange, the sole sanction for noncompliance has been
delisting. While delisting has been the exception rather than the rule, when con-
fronted with the possibility of delisting, the.directors of a listed company must
think carefully before permitting such an event to occur. It would change the
market for the company's securities, involve public disclosure and likely attract
the concern and interest of institutional and other shareholders. Therefore, it has
become the practice of listed companies to negotiate with the staffs of the ex-
changes regarding compliance with governance listing standards and the resolu-
tion of particular issues affecting such issuers. Furthermore, as governance listing
standards are reasonably uniform among the primary exchanges, issuers do not
have the option of changing their listing to another exchange to avoid a given
standard. While this may change in the future if liquidity shifts to other markets,
for the time being, the lack of alternatives for listed issuers aids the enforcement
of corporate governance listing standards.
As a result, involuntary delisting proceedings are rarely initiated on corporate
governance grounds. Of the nearly 2,300 delistings recorded by Nasdaq in 1999,
2000 and 2001, only 15 issuers were delisted for violating corporate governance
standards. Of these 15, most were for failure to comply with annual meeting and
137. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1258 (1984). The SEC staff
recognized this limitation in 1980, conceding that the SROs "cannot be expected to be at the forefront
of changes in corporate accountability" due to competitive pressures. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF RULES RELATING TO
SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL PROCESS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY H23 (Comm. Print 1980) (prepared for Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.).
138. Albert B. Crenshaw, SEC To Toughen Rule on Option Plans, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at El.
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shareholder approval requirements.139 However, this year, Nasdaq has delisted 17
issuers for, at least in part, violating corporate governance standards.140 The NYSE
has not delisted any company in recent years solely for failure to meet corporate
governance standards.
The courts have generally agreed that a listing agreement is a private contract
between the listed company and the exchange. As such, specific listing standards
may not be enforced by shareholders or other third parties dissatisfied with ex-
change inaction. 14 1 In a few cases, courts have granted injunctions in favor of
shareholders seeking to block certain corporate actions deemed likely to result in
delisting proceedings.142 In each of these cases, however, the shareholders' success
depended on a showing that the pending corporate action was likely to result in
delisting (a substantial harm). An explicit threat by an exchange to delist an
offending company has been considered adequate proof of the likelihood of harm;
failure to present evidence of such a threat, however, proved fatal to at least one
claim. 43 Even private enforcement, therefore, is subject on some level to the
discretion of the exchanges.
144
SECTION II.
REGULATION AND AUTHORITY
The self-regulatory authority of exchanges is primarily concerned with their
members and the operation and administration of securities markets. Specifically,
sections 6 and 15A, section 11A, and section 19 of the Exchange Act include
provisions relative to exchange activities and rulemaking and the oversight role
of the SEC. The application of these provisions to corporate governance listing
standards is limited and somewhat uncertain, particularly as a result of the 1990
decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Business Roundtable, the only
decision to address the subject.
139. See generally NASDAQ MARKET DATA, available at http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.coml
mr modulemenu.asp. The most common reason issuers were involuntarily delisted from Nasdaq
during this period was for failure to meet minimum quantitative requirements for continued listing.
140. Kate Kelly, Stock Exchanges Fortify Watchdog Roles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at C1.
141. See, e.g., State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F2d 843, 851-53 (2d Cir. 1981); Salter
v. NYSE, No. 98 Civ. 4670,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5262 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999); Mackubin v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 57 A.2d 318, 322 (Md. 1948).
142. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 E2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984); Rievman v. Burlington
N. R.R., 618 F Supp. 592, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 91, 288 (Bat. Cir. Ct. May 16, 1963); cf. Gearhart Indus.,
Inc. v. Smith Int'l., Inc., 741 F2d 707, 726 (5th Cir. 1984).
143. See British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 E Supp.
1519, 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
144. While section 19(g) of the Exchange Act requires the exchanges and the NASD to enforce
their rules with respect to members and persons associated with members, that requirement does not
extend to enforcement of listing standards against issuers. See Exchange Act § 19(g), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(g)(1)(a) (2000).
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A. SECTION 19 AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LISTING STANDARDS
1. SEC Authority Over Listing Standards Prior to 1975
Although the provisions contained in current section 19 of the Exchange Act
were promulgated as part of the 1975 Amendments, the SEC had power to influ-
ence SRO listing standards long before the passage of the 1975 Amendments.
From its original enactment in 1934145 until the 1975 Amendments, the Exchange
Act granted the SEC clear authority to abrogate and amend SRO rules, including
listing standards. Former section 19(b) of the Exchange Act provided:
The [SEC] is further authorized, if after making appropriate request in writ-
ing to a national securities exchange that such exchange effect on its own
behalf specified changes in its rules and practices, and after appropriate no-
tice and opportunity for hearing, the [SEC] determines that such exchange
has not made the changes so requested, and that such changes are necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in
securities traded on such exchange or to insure fair administration of such
exchange, by rules or regulations or by order to alter or supplement the rules
of such exchange (insofar as necessary or appropriate to effect such changes)
in respect of such matters as ... (3) the listing or striking from listing of any
security; ... and (13) similar matters.1 46
The SEC never used its section 19(b) authority over listing standards during
the period from 1934 to 1975. In fact, during this period, the SEC invoked its
section 19(b) authority very few times, and only with respect to the regulation of
SRO members.
47
2. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
The 1975 Amendments were intended to harmonize SEC authority over the
various SROs by expanding the Exchange Act to cover Nasdaq (through the
NASD, a "registered association of securities dealers," as defined in the new section
15A of the Exchange Act) in addition to "registered national securities exchanges."
145. Id. § 78a.
146. H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 172-73 (1975) (emphasis added); see Securities Reform Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s). The SEC had more
limited powers before the 1975 Amendments with respect to NASD rules than it did over exchange
rules. See H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 150-51.
147. In 1941, the SEC used its section 19(b) authority to disapprove rules adopted by the NYSE
that restricted the ability of members to trade NYSE-listed securities on other exchanges. See Rules of
the New York, Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 3033, 10 S.E.C. 270 (Oct. 4, 1941) (Multiple
Trading Case) (NYSE rule prohibiting dealings on other markets declared to be against public interest
and illegal); see also Rules of the New York, Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 3053, 1941
SEC LEXIS 197 (Oct. 23, 1941) (discussion by the SEC of its authority under former section 19(b)
to alter exchange rules that impose burdens on competition and have other ill effects). In 1975, the
SEC premised the elimination of fixed minimum commission rates on national securities exchanges
on its section 19(b) authority by adopting Rule 19b-3. Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-
3, Exchange Act Release No. 11,203, 40 Fed. Reg. 7394, 7394 (Jan. 23, 1975); see also Rules of the
New York, Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 3053, 1941 SEC LEXIS 197 (Oct. 23, 1941).
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In so doing, the 1975 Amendments reformulated section 19(b) and added a new
section 19(c) to the Exchange Act. As a result, section 19(b) currently defines the
process by which SROs can change their rules on their own initiative, while
section 19(c) grants the SEC certain authority unilaterally to "abrogate, add to,
and delete from"148 the rules of an SRO.
3. Section 19(b): The Consistency Standard
Section 19(b) provides that, in order to propose new rules or amend existing
rules, an SRO must file with the SEC a copy of the proposed rule or amendment
for publication by the SEC and the solicitation of comments from interested par-
ties. 149 Once the prescribed comment period lapses:
The [SEC] shall approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory orga-
nization if it finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the re-
quirements of [the Exchange Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization. The [SEC] shall disapprove a proposed rule
change ... if it does not make such finding.15 0
Section 19(b) grants SROs authority with respect to their own rulemaking by
requiring the SEC to approve any rule change proposed by an SRO that is con-
sistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act applicable to SROs, i.e., pro-
posals that meet the consistency standard. Conversely, section 19(b) requires the
SEC to disapprove a proposed rule if the SEC is unable to make such a finding.' 5 1
Sections 6(b) and 15A(b) of the Exchange Act set forth requirements relating
to the rules of a national securities exchange and a national securities association,
respectively15 2 Accordingly, courts have repeatedly held that these sections set
forth the requirements of the Exchange Act that are applicable to SROs, as referred
to in the section 19(b) consistency standard. For example, in considering a chal-
lenge to a rule adopted pursuant to section 19(b) that regulated SRO members,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that, when applying the section 19(b)
consistency standard, "[a] mong the applicable requirements of [the Exchange Act]
dealing with securities exchanges, are factors that the [SEC] is required to consider
before registering a securities exchange, [section 6(b)] ."53 This use of section 6(b)
of the Exchange Act (section 6(b) to interpret the section 19(b) consistency stan-
148. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
149. Id. § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1).
150. Id. § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (emphasis added).
151. When a proposed rule change would have a "significant policy implication," the Congress
made it clear that the SEC was not to accede passively, but to issue "its own statement as to the
regulatory need for and appropriateness of the self-regulatory rule change." S. REP. No. 94-75, at 30
(1975) [hereinafter Senate Report]; see also New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
12,249, 1976 SEC LEXIS 2116 (Mar. 23, 1976).
152. Each of sections 6(b) and 15A(b) sets forth nearly identical registration requirements relating
to the rules of an exchange or association of brokers and dealers, respectively These sections provide
both affirmative requirements for the rules of national securities exchanges and for a national asso-
ciation of brokers and dealers (i.e., the NASD) and negative injunctions against such rules that would
have improper purposes or effects.
153. Clement v. SEC, 674 E2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1982).
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dard) followed a precedent set by the Seventh Circuit, 5 4 and has since been
adopted in the District of Columbia Circuit.15 5 Moreover, this interpretation is
supported by the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments.
15 6
Like most of the Exchange Act provisions relating to SROs, however, each of
these cases, as well as most of the provisions of sections 6(b) and 15A(b), primarily
relates to the regulation of SRO markets, SRO members and their associated per-
sons. In fact, the only provision of section 6(b) or 15A(b) that is likely to be
relevant to corporate governance listing standards as rules that affect issuers is
the requirement that such rules "not [be] designed to permit unfair discrimination
between ... issuers .... ,157 While other provisions in section 6(b) or 15A(b) may
also set more generalized conditions on listing standards, '5  the section 19(b)
consistency standard appears to give SROs substantial latitude to adopt corporate
governance listing standards. Clearly this latitude is subject to the negative in-
junction that listing standards not be "designed to permit unfair discrimination"
154. Belenke v. SEC, 606 E2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that both sections 6(b) and 1 lA
may be used to interpret section 19(b) with respect to a rule adopted by a national securities exchange
that regulated a member).
155. Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F3d 453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding section 15A may be used to
interpret section 19(b) with respect to an NASD rule that regulated members).
156. See Senate Report, supra note 151, at 30 (stating that under section 19(b), "no change in the
rules of any self-regulatory organization may become effective until the SEC finds it to be consistent
with the registration requirements for the organization .... "). The SEC has also argued that the
"requirements" of the Exchange Act "applicable" to SROs are set forth in sections 6(b) and 15A(b).
See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,249, 1976 SEC LEXIS 2116
(Mar. 23, 1976).
In the view of the [SEC], a proposed rule change would not be consistent with the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder if, among other things, the ISECI could not make the deter-
minations required under Section 6(b) of the [Exchange] Act with respect to the rules of an
exchange which included the proposed rule change prior to registration of an exchange.
Id. at *8; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 45 Fed. Reg.
83,707, 83,715 (Dec. 12, 1980).
157. Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1) (2000); id. § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3(b)(6). The negative injunctions in sections 6(b)(8) and 15A(b)(9) against rules that impose unnec-
essary or inappropriate burdens on competition could, at least in theory, be relevant, but we are not
aware of situations in which listing standards have been deemed to have such potential effects. Sections
6(b)(9) and 15A(b)(12) also provide direct requirements on SRO rules relating to the listing of se-
curities issued in limited partnership rollup transactions. See id. § 6(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(9); id.
§ 15A(b)(12), 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(12). However, given the specificity of these provisions, they have
little applicability to corporate governance listing standards in general. See id. § 6(b)(9), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b)(9); id. § 15A(b)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(12). While other sections of the Exchange Act also
mention issuers, they are not directly relevant to a discussion of listing standards. See, e.g., id. § 6(b)(3),
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3); id. § 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (providing that "one or more directors
[of each SRO] shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a member
of the [SRO], broker, or dealer."); id. § 6(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4); id. § 15A(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3(b)(5) (requiring the "equitable allocation of [SRO] dues, fees, and other charges among [its) members
and issuers and other persons using [its] facilities") (quoting section 6(b)(4), as the language of sections
6(b)(4) and 15A(b)(5) differs in certain minor respects).
158. For example, sections 6(b)(5) and 15(b)(6) each also requires that the rules of an exchange
and an association of dealers be designed "to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices"
and "to protect investors and the public interest." Id. § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). Accordingly, an
SRO's authority to adopt corporate governance listing standards may also be subject to these require-
ments. See id. § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5); id. § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6).
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among issuers as set forth in sections 6(b) and 15A(b). Depending on the subject
matter of the listing standard in question, however, additional provisions of the
Exchange Act may also set requirements relevant to the application of the section
19(b) consistency standard.
Although the consistency standard has not been judicially addressed with re-
spect to corporate governance listing standards, a Task Force of the American Bar
Association found the nondiscrimination standard to be the only restriction on
an SRO's authority to adopt corporate governance listing standards under the
consistency standard. 59 For example, in a 1987 comment letter respecting the
SEC release proposing Rule 19c-4, the ABA asserted that "when proposed ex-
change rule changes relating to listing standards are filed with the [SEC] under
section 19(b), the responsibility of the [SEC] is to ensure that the proposed rule
changes do not result in 'unfair discrimination' among issuers and are not incon-
sistent with the purposes of the [Exchange Act] required to be carried out by the
exchanges in establishing their rules."1 60 This reading of section 19(b) is also
consistent with the premise that listing is ultimately a private agreement between
an exchange and an issuer and, if consistent with the terms of the Exchange Act
applicable to the SRO, the terms of this agreement should be accepted.161
4. Section 19(c): The Purposes Standard
Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, on the other hand, grants the SEC certain
direct authority unilaterally to change SRO rules, providing in pertinent part:
The [SEC], by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinafter in
this subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self-
regulatory organization (other than a registered clearing agency) as the [SEC]
deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-
159. See, e.g., Comment Letter from the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Task Force on New York Stock Exchange Listing Require-
ments, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 31, 1986) [here-
inafter 1986 ABA Comment Letter] (on file with the Special Study Group); Comment Letter from the
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee,
Task Force on Disparate Voting Rights, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Aug. 5, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 ABA Comment Letter] (on file with The Special Study
Group); Comment Letter from the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee, Task Force on Listing Standards of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (June 13, 1988).
160. 1987 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 159, at 14; see also 1986 ABA Comment Letter, supra
note 159, at 4 (arguing that "the structure and content of listing agreements between exchanges and
issuers are, except for questions of 'unfair discrimination' among issuers, outside the scope of the
[SEC's] oversight and regulatory jurisdiction").
161. But see, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 151, at 23:
The Committee concurs in the need to emphasize the mutual regulatory responsibilities of the
industry and the SEC. However, it believes care should be exercised, lest the use of phrases such
as "partnership" and "cooperative regulation" lead to the impression that the industry and the
government fulfill the same function in the regulatory framework or that they enjoy the same
order of authority or deserve the same degree of deference, whether by firms, courts or the
Congress. The self-regulatory organizations exercise authority subject to SEC oversight. They
have no authority to regulate independently of the SEC's control.
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regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter
and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act] .... 162
Therefore, under section 19(c) the SEC has authority to impose new SRO rules
or amend or delete existing SRO rules whenever it deems it "necessary or appro-
priate" (i) to "insure the fair administration" of the SRO; (ii) to "conform" the
SRO's rules to the "requirements" of the Exchange Act applicable to SROs; 63 or
(iii) otherwise "in furtherance of the purposes of" the Exchange Act. Due to its
generality, it appears that the purposes standard set forth in the third prong of
section 19(c) would define the outer reach of SEC authority to impose corporate
governance listing standards.
Use of the word "purposes" by the Congress in the third prong of section 19(c)
might be interpreted to be a reference to any of the enumerated policies under-
lying the Exchange Act, including, most broadly, the "reasons" set forth in section
2 of the Exchange Act. These reasons include the fact that securities transactions
are a matter of "national public interest" and the need to protect "interstate com-
merce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power ... the national banking
system and Federal Reserve System, and ... the maintenance of fair and honest
markets." 6 Therefore, presumably the purposes standard can be met whenever
the SEC determines that the imposition of a given SRO rule change facilitates the
achievement of any such purpose, or underlying policy, of the Exchange Act,
provided the rule change does not violate any of the negative limitations in section
6(b) or 15A(b). However, the breadth and generality of these enumerated pur-
poses combined with the lack of any congressional intent to federalize aspects of
corporate law would make it difficult to justify the SEC's use of section 19(c) to
impose specific corporate governance listing standards, absent some independent
relation to an Exchange Act purpose in addition to the purposes enumerated in
section 2. As such, the limits of SEC authority over corporate governance listing
standards under the purposes standard of section 19(c) are uncertain.
In the 1986 and 1987 ABA Comment Letters, the ABA took an even narrower
view of SEC authority over corporate governance listing standards under section
19(c). In these letters, the ABA asserted that the "unfair discrimination" require-
ments of sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6) also limit the SEC's section 19(c) au-
thority under the purposes standard unilaterally to amend corporate governance
listing standards. According to this view, section 2 of the Exchange Act is irrelevant
162. Exchange Act §19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (emphasis added).
163. Similar to the language of section 19(b), this authority to "conform" an SRO's rules to the
"requirements" of the Exchange Act is likely also a reference to sections 6(b) and 15A(b). See id. § 6(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1); id. § 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2). Accordingly, the SEC's authority under
this prong of section 19(c) is likely relevant principally to taking unilateral action to conform an SRO's
rules to insure that such rules do not discriminate among issuers unless, in a specific instance, other
provisions of the Exchange Act are applicable. See, e.g., supra notes 157 and 158 for a discussion of
the SEC's authority to prevent SRO rules form discriminating among issuers.
164. Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b). Section 11A also sets forth additional "purposes"
underlying the Exchange Act that could be applicable to an interpretation of section 19(c). See infra
note 180.
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to an interpretation of section 19(c). Rather, under both the third "purposes"
prong and the second "requirements" prong, section 19(c) grants the SEC au-
thority unilaterally to change an existing corporate governance requirement only
where such requirement creates an "'unfair discrimination' among issuers."165
There is another interpretation. Prior to the passage of the 1975 Amendments,
section 19(b) clearly granted the SEC direct authority to change listing standards
(as described above). It has been suggested that the legislative history of the 1975
Amendments indicates that the Congress intended to expand the SEC's authority
over SRO rulemaking, as a general matter. According to the Senate Report con-
cerning the 1975 Amendments, "the bill would greatly expand the [SEC's] direct
regulatory powers over the nation's trading markets and the participants in those
markets.' 1 66 The Senate Report continued:
[Tihere has been a continuing controversy as to the precise scope of the
SEC's power to amend the rules of a self-regulatory organization. [Section
19(c) of this] bill would give the SEC clear authority to amend any self-
regulatory organization's rules in any respect consistent with the objectives
of the Exchange Act .... 17
However, the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments is also clear that the
primary congressional concern in amending section 19 related to the SEC's over-
sight of SRO rules relating to members, not the adoption of corporate governance
listing standards or the creation of a comprehensive federal corporate law through
listing standards. 68 At the same time, there is no indication in the legislative
history that the Congress intended that a different standard apply to SEC authority
over corporate governance listing standards than to SEC authority over SRO rules
affecting members.
In the years following the 1975 Amendments, the SEC also asserted that these
amendments granted it broad authority to amend SRO rules unilaterally For ex-
165. 1986 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 159, at 4; see also 1987 ABA Comment Letter, supra
note 159, at 14 (concluding that SEC "authority and responsibility under Section 19(c) is similarly
limited[]" to ensuring that SRO rules do not result in "unfair discrimination" among issuers). The
Special Study Group is of the view that, after Business Roundtable, the ABA's interpretation in the 1986
and 1987 ABA Comment Letters of section 19(c)'s application to corporate governance listing stan-
dards as relating only to the "unfair discrimination" test of sections 6(b) and 15A(b) (rather than the
general purposes of sections 2 and 1 IA) is too limited.
166. See Senate Report, supra note 151, at 30-31. In addition, the Congress's statements in the
legislative history concerning the SEC's ability to deal with situations where its "indirect" section 19(c)
authority overlaps its "direct" rulemaking authority under other provisions of the Exchange Act con-
firms that the Congress knew that the SEC's indirect authority under section 19(c) is broader than
the direct authority granted to the SEC under other provisions of the Exchange Act. Indeed the
Congress's inclusion of section 19(c)(4) in the 1975 Amendments evidences a recognition that the
SEC's indirect authority under section 19(c) is not coterminous with its direct authority under other
sections of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 19(c)(2)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(4)(A); see also Senate
Report, supra note 151, at 31-32 ("In order to avoid any doubt as to the SEC's authority in areas
where its direct authority overlaps its indirect authority, Section 19(c)(4) would make clear that where
the [SEC] has direct authority, it would not be required to proceed under Section 19(c) or to follow
the [more rigorous] procedures specified in that section.").
167. Senate Report, supra note 151, at 31; see also S. REP. No. 93-13, at 174 (1973).
168. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 151, at 30-32.
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ample, in a 1977 release, the SEC stated that the amended section 19 together
with the amended section 6(b) grant the SEC authority to revise any existing
exchange rules unilaterally169 If correct, this reading of section 19(c) would grant
the SEC broad authority over all aspects of SRO rulemaking, including the adop-
tion of corporate governance listing standards. 170 This reading of section 19(c),
however, was tested in Business Roundtable.
5. The Business Roundtable Decision
For all practical purposes, the opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Business Roundtable ended the debate as to SEC authority, by effectively shutting
the door on the SEC's use of section 19(c) to impose corporate governance listing
standards. In its opinion, the court unanimously held that section 19(c) did not
confer authority upon the SEC unilaterally to impose a voting rights listing stan-
dard on the exchanges or Nasdaq. Careful analysis of the Business Roundtable
decision is appropriate to an examination of SEC authority in this area.
As described in the preceding section, in 1987, after failing to convince the
NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq to act uniformly, the SEC invoked its section 19(c)
authority and promulgated Rule 19c-4, which barred the exchanges and Nasdaq
from listing securities with certain disparate voting rights.
The court in Business Roundtable abrogated Rule 19c-4 on the ground that the
rule "directly controlIled] the substantive allocation of powers among classes of
shareholders" and therefore was "in excess of the [SEC's] authority under § 19 of
the [Exchange Act] ." 71 In reaching this conclusion, the court held first that it was
"indisputable" that the listing standard in question was a "rule" covered by sections
19(b) and 19(c). 72 The problem lay, however, in the use by the SEC of section
19(c) with respect to the rule at hand. Specifically, the court quoted section 19(c)
and noted that the SEC authority granted pursuant to that section is limited to
169. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945
(Mar. 9, 1977); see Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Con-
cealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No.
15,570, 1979 SEC LEXIS 2141 (Feb. 15, 1979); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for
"Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 829-30 (1987).
170. Although members of the Special Study Group have differing views with respect to this broad
subject matter, the members unanimously agree that a resolution of these issues is not relevant to
this Study
171. Bus. Roundtable, 905 E2d at 407.
172. Id. at 410. To reach this conclusion, the court relied on section 3(a)(27) of the Exchange Act,
which states, in relevant part,
The term "rules of an exchange", [and] "rules of [ the NASD]" means the constitution articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and rules, or instruments corresponding to the foregoing, of an exchange,
[the NASD], respectively, and such of the stated policies, practices, and interpretations of such
exchange, association, or clearing agency as the [SEC], by rule, may determine to be necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to be deemed to be rules
of such exchange, [or the NASD].
Exchange Act § 3(a)(27), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(27).
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those actions taken "in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act." Ac-
cordingly, the court asked, "What then are the 'purposes' of the Exchange Act?" 173
The SEC argued that the Exchange Act purposes potentially relevant to Rule
19c-4 were: (i) the proxy rules under section 14 of the Exchange Act; (ii) the
grant of authority to the SEC under sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6) to "protect
investors and the public interest;" and (iii) the grant of authority in section
11A(a)(2) to the SEC to "facilitate the establishment of a national market system."
In response to the SEC's section 14 argument, the court determined the primary
purposes of section 14 to be "adequate disclosure in proxy solicitations" and
"voting procedures." With respect to the former, the court found Rule 19c-4 en-
tirely unrelated and, with respect to the latter, the court stated, "With its step
beyond control of voting procedure and into the distribution of voting power, the
[SEC] would assume an authority that the Exchange Act's proponents disclaimed
any intent to grant.' ' 174 The court found the provisions relied on in the SEC's
section 6(b)(5)/15A(b)(6) and section 1 1A(a)(2) arguments as being too tenuous
to interpret as an indication of a congressional intent to permit such a broad
federal preemption over corporate governance and shareholder voting rights, mat-
ters traditionally left to state corporate law.
In an effort to distinguish between Rule 19c-4 and existing corporate gover-
nance listing standards approved by the SEC pursuant to section 19(b), the
court stated:
[The] Congress appears to have contemplated exchanges' taking (1) some
measures that regulate members with delegated governmental authority
and that are required to be, at a minimum, related to the purposes of the
[Exchange] Act, and (2) others, that do not regulate members and do not
rely on government regulatory authority, for which there is no such require-
ment. As we read the [Exchange] Act, both categories are subject to [SEC]
review under § 19(b) and to amendment under § 19(c), but for some rules
in the second category-those which do not regulate members and are not
related to the purposes of the [Exchange] Act-the [SEC's authority] will be
quite limited. 175
The court included corporate governance listing standards in the second category
on grounds that listing standards do not implicate "any governmental authority
to 'regulate' the issuer.' 76 Therefore, according to the court, SEC authority either
to (i) unilaterally change SRO rules relating to the corporate governance of issuers
under section 19(c) or (ii) disapprove of SRO proposed rules relating to the cor-
porate governance of issuers under section 19(b) is "quite limited." Although this
limited power was left undefined, the court was clear in holding:
173. Bus. Roundtable, 905 E2d. at 410.
174. Id. at 411.
175. Id. at 414.
176. Id.
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[A validation of the SEC's adoption of Rule 19c-41 would... overturn or at
least impinge severely on the tradition of state regulation of corporate law.
... We read the [Exchange] Act as reflecting a clear congressional determi-
nation not to make any such broad delegation of power to the [SEC] .1 7
A contrary view holds that, rather than rejecting absolutely the use of section
19(c) to impose corporate governance listing standards, Business Roundtable ac-
tually suggests that section 19(c) grants the SEC authority to impose such stan-
dards, provided the use of that authority in a given instance is predicated on a
statutory purpose applicable to the specific listing standard. In the case of Rule
19c-4, some have suggested, citing dicta in the Business Roundtable opinion, 78
that the SEC should have premised its use of section 19(c) on the Williams Act.
However, even if the court upheld the SEC's authority to adopt Rule 19c-4 on
the ground that the matters regulated by Rule 19c-4 are included within the
purposes of the Williams Act, the court's analysis of the statutory structure,
and its requirement that any SEC use of section 19(c) authority must be tied to
a clear statutory purpose, might not have changed. Either way, these argu-
ments are of limited practical utility given that Business Roundtable is the only
judicial interpretation of SEC authority under section 19 over corporate gover-
nance listing standards.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the Business Roundtable decision, it closed
a chapter on the SEC's use of its section 19(c) powers to impose corporate gov-
ernance standards on public issuers through listing standards. The practical effects
of Business Roundtable on SRO authority under section 19(b) and SEC authority
under section 19(c) over corporate governance listing standards are as follows:
" Corporate governance listing standards are "rules" for purposes of the Ex-
change Act and, as such, must be adopted pursuant to section 19 of the
Exchange Act.
" The Exchange Act does not enable the SEC to establish a comprehensive
federal corporate law through listing standards.
* SEC authority over corporate governance listing standards pursuant to
section 19(c) is uncertain and limited to matters that are in furtherance of
the purposes of the Exchange Act. Therefore, this authority must be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis with respect to a specific purpose of the
Exchange Act.
177. Id. at 412-13.
178. See id. at 417 ("We do not decide whether the [SEC] could invoke other statutory provisions
to provide the legal authority for promulgating these or similar regulations. The sections relied on
here are insufficient. Even if other statutory provisions could support the [SEC's] asserted authority,
we cannot supply grounds to sustain the regulations that were not invoked by the [SEC] below. In
any case a change in the jurisdictional basis would almost certainly alter the substantive content of
the final regulations.") (citations omitted). The "other statutory provisions" referred to are those other
than the ones the SEC cited in its briefs. Id. at 417 n.1O ("Some commentators argued that the [SEC]
could ground its authority in the Williams Act, but the [SEC] did not rely on these provisions.")
(citations omitted).
1526 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 57, August 2002
" Presumably due to these considerations, the SEC has not sought to invoke
its section 19(c) authority since Business Roundtable was decided but has
instead relied on its powers of persuasion, as described above, to enlist
the SROs' cooperation in amending listing standards pertaining to, e.g.,
audit committees.
Application of the section 19(b) consistency standard requires, at least,
that a proposed rule change be consistent with the nondiscrimination re-
quirement in sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6) and may require consistency
with other Exchange Act provisions depending on the subject matter of
the proposal.
B. SECTION 1 A: SEC AUTHORITY AND JOINT SRO ACTION
Section 11A of the Exchange Act provides the SEC with another broad grant
of authority over SROs. Specifically, section 11A(a) grants the SEC authority:
having due regard for the public interest, the protection of investors, and the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to use its authority under [the
Exchange Act] to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for
securities ... by rule or order, to authorize or require self-regulatory orga-
nizations to act jointly with respect to matters as to which they share au-
thority under [the Exchange Act] in planning, developing, operating, or reg-
ulating a national market system (or a subsystem thereof) or one or more
facilities thereof .... 179
Although these provisions appear to provide the SEC with an additional source
of authority with respect to SRO corporate governance listing standards, upon
closer analysis the ability to draw such a conclusion is less clear. The language of
the statute specifically authorizes SEC use of the powers described above "to carry
out the objectives set forth in paragraph (1) of [section 11A(a)]," which primarily
addresses the creation of technological systems that facilitate investor access to
efficient execution in an increasingly electronic securities marketplace. 180
179. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2)-(3)(B) (2000).
180. Id. § 1lA(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2). Section 11A(a)(1) provides as follows:
The Congress finds that-
(A) The securities markets are an important national asset which must be preserved and
strengthened.
(B) New data processing and communications techniques create the opportunity for more effi-
cient and effective market operations.
(C) It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance
of fair and orderly markets to assure-
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to quo-
tations for and transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best market; and
(v) an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this subpara-
graph, for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.
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The legislative history of section 1 1A generally supports this conclusion. For
example, in defining the national market system, the Senate Report finds that
"communications systems designed to provide automated dissemination of last
sale and quotation information with respect to securities will form the heart of
the national market system." 8 The Senate Report continues by defining the pur-
poses underlying the section 1 A grant of authority to the SEC as follows:
The goals of this pervasive regulatory authority would be to insure the avail-
ability of prompt and accurate trading information, to assure that these com-
munications networks are not controlled or dominated by any particular
market center, to guarantee fair access to such systems by all brokers, dealers
and investors, and to prevent any competitive restriction on their operation
not justified by the purposes of the Exchange Act.182
The general grant of authority to take action under section 1 1A having regard
for the public interest, protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets is the directive which the SEC must follow in authorizing ex-
changes to act jointly with respect to exchanges as to which they share authority
in planning, developing, operating or regulating a national market system or one
or more of its facilities. While there is no precedent, we believe there is a basis
upon which the SEC could sanction joint action by the exchanges as described
in the Proposal because the best practices established by the exchanges are not
binding (and should not be considered binding) and therefore excluded from the
Business Roundtable holding and the need for SEC approval. 8 3 It is essentially a
procedural mechanism that relates to the operation or regulation of a national
market system in the broadest sense. It obviously does not deal with the actual
conduct of the national market system, but without issuers and measures that
promote the integrity of the markets, the directives of section 11A in the statute
might not be achieved.
C. OTHER
1. SEC Authority Over the Listing Policies
of Foreign Exchanges
Underlying the continued primacy of the U.S. securities markets is the SEC's
imposition of its views concerning whether a non-U.S. securities exchange is
(D) The linking of all markets for qualified securities through communication and data pro-
cessing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information available
to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors' orders, and contribute
to best execution of such orders.
Id. § 11A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1).
Additionally, to date, the SEC has not issued an order pursuant to section 1 1A with respect to SRO
rules applicable to issuers. Of the 34 section 1 A orders examined for this report, three related to the
creation of a consolidated quotation system, 10 related to the creation of an intermarket options linkage,
16 addressed ITS, five were concerned with decimalization, and one addressed problems raised by the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. (One order addressed both ITS and decimalization.)
181. Senate Report, supra note 151, at 9.
182. Id.
183. In addition, an SEC order pursuant to section 1 A may support a finding of implied repeal
of the antitrust laws with respect to any joint activities among SROs. See supra note 4.
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"present" in the United States and is thus required to register as an exchange. If
a non-U.S. exchange is required to register in the United States, its listed com-
panies become subject to U.S. reporting standards and U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) by virtue of section 12(b) of the Exchange
Act, which imposes those requirements on companies listed on an exchange reg-
istered under the Exchange Act. Under current SEC policy,18 4 a non-U.S. exchange
will be deemed to be "present" in the United States if it directly appeals to U.S.
investors or broker-dealers by, e.g., soliciting their order flow. As a result, for
example, while broker-dealers are free to have on their desks screens showing
trading activity and quotations on non-U.S. exchanges, and they can make that
information available to their institutional customers, any resulting orders must
be transmitted through a U.S. broker to a non-U.S. broker for transmission to the
exchange. If a U.S. broker has a membership on a non-U.S. exchange, it is not
permitted to transmit the orders directly to the non-U.S. exchange, but must use
another member, perhaps an affiliated company, that is not a U.S. broker to trans-
mit the order to the non-U.S. exchange. The non-U.S. exchange is not permitted
to avoid registration in the United States by, for example, registering as a broker-
dealer and complying with the SEC's Form ATS.18 5 The result of this bulwark
against foreign intrusion is to protect the U.S. exchanges from substantial foreign
competition and to protect U.S. GAAP from some of the pressure on the Financial
Accounting Standards Board and others to conform it to International GAAP As
noted above, as long as the U.S. markets are the only markets that can directly
access U.S. brokers, dealers and institutional investors, and foreign markets would
have to register as national securities exchanges to compete in that arena, non-
U.S. exchanges that sought direct access to the United States would, by registering
under the Exchange Act, cause their listed companies to comply with section
12(b) of the Exchange Act. That in turn not only would subject them to SEC
oversight of their listing rules, but the listed companies would have to reconcile
to U.S. GAAP
Consequently, the U.S. policy, by excluding non-U.S. exchanges from direct
access to U.S. dealers and institutional investors, tends to support U.S. GAAP It
184. See Concept Release on Exchange Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,485 (May 23, 1997) [hereinafter Regulation ATS Concept Release].
185. In the case of the Tradepoint Exchange (Tradepoint), an electronic exchange regulated under
U.K. law as a recognized investment exchange, the SEC determined that a non-U.S. exchange that
targeted U.S. investors in its marketing is subject to the registration requirement of the Exchange Act.
The SEC nevertheless granted Tradepoint a low-volume exemption from registration. Tradepoint Fi-
nancial Networks plc, Exchange Act Release No. 41,199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,953, 14,956 (Mar. 22,
1999). In that release, the SEC articulated more broadly its theory of exchange registration as applied
to non-U.S. entities:
The [SEC] believes that an exchange operated offshore but targeting U.S. persons, which is owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, through a financial interest or otherwise, by a U.S. national
securities exchange or national securities association, would be considered a U.S. market operated
by an SRO. As such, it would be subject to [SEC] oversight. The [SEC] notes that Tradepoint, as
a condition to this Order, has agreed that it is subject to the [SEC's] jurisdiction.
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also protects the SEC's ability to engraft onto a U.S. exchange's listing standards
substantive matters affecting corporate governance which the non-U.S. exchanges
have traditionally excluded from their listing standards. If it were otherwise, and
non-U.S. exchanges could offer access to U.S. investment capital in the secondary
markets similar to the access U.S. exchanges offer, many U.S. issuers, particularly
start-up companies that do not have an established tradition of NYSE or Nasdaq
listing, could be tempted to eschew the U.S. markets and go to non-U.S. ex-
changes for listings. This might well weaken the U.S. markets' ability to compete
for such listings and could, in turn, weaken the SEC's ability to maintain influence
over corporate governance through exchange-listing standards.
In a market environment where technological advances make national bound-
aries increasingly unimportant, it remains to be seen how long the existing reg-
ulatory speed bumps, which require broker-to-broker order transmission rather
than direct linkages between non-U.S. exchanges and U.S. persons, will continue
to have economic significance. It may well be, for example, that as securities
transactions are increasingly effected via "straight-through processing," the costs
of inserting those mechanical elements will diminish to the point where they no
longer present any substantial obstacle to foreign exchange linkages to the United
States. That might well necessitate the SEC's rethinking of its policies toward the
application of the exchange registration requirements and might weaken further
the SEC's ability to require U.S. exchanges and other markets186 to impose non-
financial criteria in their listing and delisting standards.
2. Disclosure
The SEC has broad powers under the Exchange Act to require disclosure in pe-
riodic reports, proxy materials or other public filings of matters that are material to
shareholder voting, other decisions of investors and certain information respecting
governance practices.18 7 The SEC has regularly used this authority in connection
with corporate governance matters that it deems to be material to shareholders.
Relatively recent examples include matters pertaining to audit committee charters,
meetings and activities as well as compensation committee reports.
The SEC has the authority to require disclosure in periodic reports, proxy
materials or other public filings of a listed company's compliance (or noncom-
pliance) with the best practices guidelines established by its listing exchange. Any
such SEC rule would be subject to rulemaking proceedings with the customary
opportunity for comment by all interested parties.S" Although, as a general matter,
the SEC has such authority, the extent of SEC authority to require disclosure of
any specific item would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Therefore
186. Upon the registration of Nasdaq as a national securities exchange, the NASD will have to
provide an alternative order display facility that will foster the development of an independent "third"
market in Nasdaq securities. On December 7, 2001, NASD filed proposed rule changes looking toward
such an alternative display facility. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
45,156, 67 Fed. Reg. 388 (Dec. 14, 2001).
187. Exchange Act §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m-n.
188. See id.; see also Administrative Procedures Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2001).
1530 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 57, August 2002
we do not express any view with respect to proposals other than the comply or
explain requirement.
SECTION III.
CHANGE IN MARKET STRUCTURE
U.S. securities markets have changed dramatically over the past quarter-century
.
Transformed by technology and greater investor demand, the securities markets
have become multifaceted, with the primary markets-the NYSE, the Amex and
Nasdaq-competing for market share with an ever-increasing number of alter-
native market centers, including ATSs. As this competition continues, ATSs and
other market participants may attract increasing liquidity from the primary mar-
kets. To the extent trades are increasingly executed off the primary markets, the
NYSE, the Amex and Nasdaq may have a decreased ability and incentive to es-
tablish and maintain corporate governance listing standards.
A. THE U.S. MARKETPLACES FOR SECURITIES
1. The NYSE and the Amex
Together, the NYSE and the Amex largely dominated the market for equity
securities of U.S. issuers until the 1970s. 119 During this period, the NYSE was
considered the most prestigious exchange, distinguishing itself from its compet-
itors by imposing the most stringent listing standards.190 Using listing standards
to obtain a competitive edge, the NYSE attracted most of the largest commercial
and industrial companies in the United States.' 91 The NYSE believed that by
appealing to individual investors and improving corporate governance standards,
it could bolster trading volume by attracting not only new issuers, but also ad-
ditional investors for already listed shares.1 92 Indeed, by 1972, the NYSE's trading
volume had grown exponentially to 16 million shares per day, which represented
an over fourfold increase from its trading volume the previous decade. 193 Twenty
189. The five regional exchanges (the Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock
Exchanges) compete for order flow with the NYSE and the Amex. At an earlier point in their history,
these exchanges served as "incubator" markets for small local companies. For the past 20 years,
however, the overwhelming percentage of regional stock exchange business has been in the stocks of
companies listed on the NYSE and the Amex that the regional exchanges trade pursuant to grants of
unlisted trading privileges (UTP). See SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF MARKET
REGULATION, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (Jan. 1994)
[hereinafter MARKET 2000 STUDY]. In 1992, over 97 percent of volume of the regional stock exchanges
derived from issues traded pursuant to UTPs. See id. at 11-8, 9.
190. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 37 (2001). Since its inception, the NYSE has
been committed to ensuring the quality of its securities market and has used quantitative and quali-
tative listing standards as a means to achieve this goal. As early as 1869, a Committee on Stock List
evaluated applications to list with the NYSE. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance
Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 326 (2001).
191. See 5 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, V SECURITIES REGULATION 2530 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2001);
Michael, supra note 13, at 1465.
192. Michael, supra note 13, at 1470.
193. See MARKET 2000 STUDY, supra note 189, at 4.
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years later, in 1992, the NYSE's average daily volume exceeded 200 million
shares.194 Today, the NYSE lists almost 3,000 companies, and its average daily
share volume for the year 2001 exceeded 1 billion shares. 195
While the Amex's growth in trading volume during these periods has been
impressive, this growth has been less significant when compared with that of the
NYSE. For example, in 1972 the Amex's average daily trading volume in equity
securities was almost 4.5 million shares per day 196 By 1992, this figure had in-
creased only to approximately 14 million shares per day' 97 Today, the Amex lists
only 761 companies, and its average daily share volume for the year 2001 was
approximately 66 million shares.198
In addition to these changes in trading volume, both the NYSE and the Amex
have significantly updated their technological infrastructure to facilitate trading
and enhance market transparency For example, in 1976, the NYSE introduced
the Designated Order Turnaround system, which was a fully automated system
for electronically routing smaller orders. 199 Later, in 1984, the NYSE implemented
SuperDot 250, an electronic order-routing system that linked member firms to
specialists' posts on the trading floor. Also, in 2000, the NYSE introduced NYSE
Direct +, a high-speed electronic connection for the immediate, automatic exe-
cution of smaller limit orders.20 1 More recently, in 2001, the SEC approved the
NYSE's OpenBook, a market-data product that enhances transparency by enabling
subscribers to view information contained on the NYSE's limit order books. 20 1
Likewise, during the 1990s, Amex made substantial investments in technology,
introducing wireless handheld terminals on the trading floor, a wireless voice
system to facilitate internal broker communications and a data link digital infor-
mation service. 20 2 During this period, Amex also established a presence on the
World Wide Web, providing investors, shareholders and companies with infor-
mation and market data on its listed companies and products. 20 3
2. Nasdaq
Given the emergence and growth of Nasdaq, the transformation in the markets
for securities not listed on an exchange, or over-the-counter securities, has been
dramatic. Nasdaq, which is currently operated by the NASD, is an inter-dealer
quotation system for the OTC market. Prior to Nasdaq's creation, dealer quota-
194. SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, SELECTED INDUSTRY STATISTICS, available at http://www.sia.com/reference-
materials/pdf/keystats.pdf.
195. Id.
196. THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, THE 1986 FACT BOOK (1986).
197. SEC. INDUS. Ass'N, 2000-2001 SEC. INDUSTRY Y.B., MARKET ACTIVWTY-1985-1999, at 1002.
198. SELECTED INDUSTRY STATISTICS, supra note 194.
199. NYSE, TIMELINE AT A GLANCE, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/timeline/161315.html.
200. NYSE, TIMELINE AT A GLANCE, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/timeline/161327.html.
201. Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Receives Approval from SEC on NYSE OpenBook (Dec. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00067F26.html.
202. AMEX, ABOUT AMEX-HISTORY, available at http://www.amex.com/atamex/aboutamex/history/
aboutAmex historyhtml.
203. Id.
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tions were disseminated by paper copy These copies were printed on pink paper,
prompting the reference to OTC securities as "pink sheet" stocks.20 4 During this
time, the OTC market was highly fragmented and plagued by pricing inefficiency
and a lack of transparency. It also lacked any meaningful listing standards for the
issuers of securities traded in this market. Initially, Nasdaq was merely a system
within the OTC market that publicly displayed representative quotes for certain
securities. 20 5 Dealers could disseminate bid and offer quotes for securities, but
were not obligated to execute orders.20 6 All actual transactions were agreed upon
through telephone communications.
Since its inception in 1971, Nasdaq has taken significant steps in automating
OTC market-making and increasing the efficiency and transparency of the OTC
market. For example, in 1981, Nasdaq introduced its first automatic execution
system, the Computer Assisted Execution System (CAES), 20 7 which allows market-
makers to enter quotes that are automatically executed. Shortly thereafter, in 1984,
Nasdaq introduced another automatic execution system, the Small Order Exe-
cution System (SOES), 20 8 to make it easier for small investors to obtain best ex-
ecution of their orders. In 1990, Nasdaq introduced a third order execution sys-
tem, SelectNet, which is designed to permit broker-dealers to negotiate
transactions through Nasdaq terminals instead of the telephone. 20 9 Most recently,
Nasdaq introduced "SuperMontage," a new order collector, display facility, and
trading platform, which was approved by the SEC in 2000.210 According to some
commentators, SuperMontage will significantly enhance transparency in Nasdaq
securities by offering NASD members the option of displaying limit orders at
additional price levels away from the top of the book (i.e., the inside quote).211
With these technological initiatives, Nasdaq's trading volume has grown ex-
ponentially over the past two decades. Indeed, by 1994, Nasdaq surpassed the
NYSE in annual share volume. 212 Likewise, as of December 2001, almost 5,100
companies traded their securities on Nasdaq, more than two times the 2,500 OTC
securities that Nasdaq included for quotation when it commenced trading in
204. See NASDAQ, NOT THE OTC, available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/about/backgrnd/
pagela.html.
205. Id. Indeed, Nasdaq arose out of a study conducted by the SEC in the early 1960s. The study,
which was released in 1961, recommended the development of an automated system to address
fragmentation in the OTC market.
206. THE NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., HISTORY OF THE NASD, available at http://www.
nasd .com/corpinfo/co ovehistr.html.
207. See Intermarket Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 18,713, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,413,
20,413 (May 6,1982).
208. HISTORY OF THE NASD, supra note 206.
209. Id.
210. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8020, 8021
(Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter SuperMontage Release].
211. Letter from Mark B. Sutton, Chairman, SIA Market Structure Committee, to The Honorable
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://
www.sia.com/2000_commentletters/pdf/limit-order-transparencypdf.
212. NASDAQ, EVOLUTION OF NASDAQ, available at http://wwwnasdaqnews.com/about/backgmd/
pagela.html.
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1971.213 Today, the NYSE and Nasdaq 1 4 are the primary markets for trading U.S.
equities. Accordingly, based on market value and dollar volume, Nasdaq is the
second largest securities market after the NYSE.21 5 Indeed, Nasdaq's trading vol-
ume dwarfs that of the Amex in terms of both dollar and share volume. As of
April 2002, Nasdaq's year-to-date share volume exceeded 148 billion, while the
Amex's share volume was less than 5 billion for the same period.21 6 It is notable
that Amex recently announced that it will permit trading of Nasdaq-listed stocks
on its trading floor to provide "access to deep liquidity" 21 7
B. SOURCES OF COMPETITION
1. The Proliferation of Alternative Trading Systems
ATSs are electronic trading networks (ECNs) operated as private businesses
rather than as SROs. ATSs are not operated as, or affiliated with, SROs. Instead,
sponsors operate ATSs as independent for-profit businesses. ATSs currently pro-
vide a forum for automated, cheaper trading in a variety of securities, including
equities, municipal and government securities, corporate debt and options. In
addition to the types of securities traded, these systems vary in the trading ap-
proaches they use. For example, systems such as Instinet, Island and Bloomberg
Tradebook allow users to enter firm orders at specific prices and execute those
orders automatically against other orders that have been entered. Crossing sys-
tems, such as those operated by Instinet and POSIT, allow investors to enter orders
to execute against corresponding orders at prevailing market prices. 2 8 However,
213. As of April 2002, the Nasdaq National Market included about 5,100 securities while the
Nasdaq SmallCap Market, included just over 1,400 issues. See NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ SMALLCAP MAR-
KET available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/about/backgrnd/pagela.html.
214. Today, Nasdaq consists of two distinct separate markets, the Nasdaq National Market and the
Nasdaq SmallCap Market. The Nasdaq SmallCap Market is the smaller capitalization tier of Nasdaq
and, accordingly, the financial criteria for listing are not as stringent as for the Nasdaq National Market.
The corporate governance standards, however, are the same for the National and SmallCap Markets.
Currently, stocks that cannot satisfy the listing requirements of the exchanges or Nasdaq can be traded
through the OTC bulletin board, NOT THE OTC, supra note 204. In addition, NASD acquired Amex
in 1998, which it currently operates as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
215. In April 2002, the NYSE's market value exceeded $11 trillion, while Nasdaq's market value
was $2.5 trillion. The Nasdaq Stock Market, Monthly Market Data, Comparing Three Markets-Nasdaq,
NYSE, Amex, available at http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/SeclSummary.asp (last visited June
2, 2002). In that month, the NYSE's dollar volume was about $932 billion, while Nasdaq's dollar
volume was about $705 billion. Id. The Amex's dollar volume, in contrast, was less than $52 billion.
Id.
216. Id.
217. News Release, Amex, Six Leading Wall Street Firms Commit To Trading Nasdaq Stocks on
the American Stock Exchange (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.amex.com/atamex/news/press/
snAmexNasdaq_040902.htm.
218. This Study uses the term "alternative trading system" or "ATS" to refer generally to automated
systems that centralize, display, match, cross or execute trading interest, but that are not registered
with the SEC as national securities exchanges or operated by a registered securities association. In
previous releases, the SEC has referred to trading systems not registered as exchanges as "proprietary
trading systems," "broker-dealer trading systems" and "electronic communications networks." Regu-
lation ATS Concept Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,486 n.1 (May 23, 1997).
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ATSs do not list, nor have they expressed any intention to list, issuers or to set
corporate governance standards, as exchanges do.
ATSs incorporate features of both traditional markets and broker-dealers. Like
traditional markets, they may:
" Centralize trading interest, providing the opportunity for multiple parties
to participate in trading;
" Specify time, price, size or other priorities governing the sequence or in-
teraction of orders;
" Provide an opportunity for active price formation (either through inter-
action of buy and sell interest or through competing dealer quotes);
" Specify material conditions under which participants may post quotations
or trading interest (such as requiring participants to maintain firm, two-
sided or continuous, quotes);
" Create mechanisms for enhancing liquidity, such as giving certain partici-
pants special privileges in exchange for assuming market obligations; and
" Impose "non-discretionary" trading rules on order interaction (e.g., time
and price priority).2 19
Like traditional broker-dealers, however, ATSs are proprietary and may main-
tain trading desks to facilitate participant trading.22 ° Increasingly, market partici-
pants have used ATSs as the functional equivalents of the self-regulated markets.
In its adopting release on Regulation ATS, the SEC discussed this trend, noting
that "[olver time, [ATSs] may become the primary market for some securities. 22'
Notwithstanding the indisputable status of the NYSE and Nasdaq as the largest
markets for U.S. securities, over the past decade ATSs have presented an increasing
competitive challenge to the self-regulated markets. In particular, advancements
in technology have fueled this growth. In 1994, the SEC's Division of Market
Regulation reported that ATSs accounted for 13 percent of the volume in Nasdaq
securities and 1.3 percent of the trading volume in NYSE-listed securities.222 Four
years later, in 1998, ATSs accounted for more than 20 percent of orders for Nasdaq
securities and almost 4 percent of orders for exchange-listed securities. 223 By 2000,
these systems attracted approximately 30 percent of Nasdaq's business.22 4 Ac-
cording to Nasdaq's market data, in January 2001, ECNs accounted for 39.9
percent of Nasdaq trading volume and 28.5 percent of Nasdaq's share volume.
Just one year later, in January 2002, ECNs accounted for 53 percent of Nasdaq's
219. Id. at 30,486.
220. Id.
221. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 40,760,
63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,845 (Dec. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Regulation ATS Release].
222. See MARKET 2000 STUDY, supra note 189, at App. IV
223. See generally Regulation ATS Release, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,844.
224. See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590,
2000 SEC LEXIS 2518, at *9 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Order Disclosure Release].
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trading volume and 35.1 percent of its share volume. 22s In addition to gaining an
increased share of trading volume, ATSs have proliferated in number. In 1991,
the SEC was aware of only a few alternative systems. 226 By 1997, more than 140
broker-dealers had notified the SEC that they operated some form of ATS. 227
Currently, ATSs execute an increasing percentage of the total volume of trades
executed in Nasdaq and NYSE securities; however the incursion into NYSE shares
has been relatively limited.
228
ATS trading innovations have had an impact on the U.S. markets, particularly
on the cost of transacting by institutional investors. In the words of then SEC
Chairman Levitt:
Electronic communication networks have been one of the most important
developments in our markets in years-perhaps decades. But exactly what
are ECNs, and what are we to make of their impact on our markets? In
simplest terms, ECNs bring buyers and sellers together for electronic exe-
cution of trades. They have provided investors with greater choices, and have
driven execution costs down to a fraction of a penny. As a result, these
networks present serious competitive challenges to the established market
centers. More fundamentally, they illustrate the breath-taking pace of change
that results when technology and competition coalesce.229
Given this success, even more recently, several buy-side market participants
have begun to create their own proprietary trading systems, which could further
challenge the traditional market structure.
2 30
Among other things, the recent explosion of volume in Nasdaq securities traded
via the ATSs raises the question as to whether the current uniformity of listing
standards may break down over time. Unlike self-regulated market centers, ATSs
do not set "listing" standards for issuers whose securities trade in their markets.
While ATSs limit trading to securities listed on an exchange, they do not evaluate
and accept issuers or enforce qualitative or quantitative listing standards.231 As
225. These statistics provide estimated counts of Nasdaq trading activity occurring on ECNs and
reported to Nasdaq. These estimates are drawn from Nasdaq trade report information submitted by
ECNs, their customers, and counterparties. See THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC., NASDAQ MARKET
DATA, available at http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/MpECNMonth.asp.
226. See generally Regulation ATS Release, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,844.
227. See Regulation ATS Concept Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,489 n.14 (May
23, 1997).
228. These volume statistics represent trades in securities, whereby each trade accounts for a buy
and sell of a security.
229. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles, Remarks at Columbia
Law School (Sept. 23, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/
spch295.htm. Note that Chairman Levitt refers to electronic communications networks, or ECNs,
which are ATSs into which, under the SEC's Order Execution Rules (Rules 1lAcd-1 and 1lAcl-4
under the Exchange Act), market-makers and exchange specialists are permitted to insert quotations
anonymously at better prices and/or larger sizes than their published quotations without updating
their own published quotations.
230. See, e.g., Rich Blake & Justin Schack, The Buy Side Wakes Up, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr.
2002, at 58; see also Thomas G. Donlon, A New Law of Large Networks, BARRONS, May 6, 2002, at 50.
231. Regulation ATS Concept Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,507 n.130 (May
23, 1997).
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ATSs gain market share, an increasing number of shares may trade in markets
that are neither required to impose, nor have any interest in imposing, substantive
corporate governance standards.
Given that the Exchange Act, when adopted in 1934, did not envision the
variety of alternative trading systems that currently provide services traditionally
provided by the self-regulated markets and the 1975 Amendments did not fully
integrate ATSs into the national market system, a regulatory response to the in-
creasing significance of ATSs as alternative market centers was required. Accord-
ingly, in 1998, the SEC adopted Regulation ATS to establish a regulatory frame-
work for ATSs and more fully integrate them into the national market system.2 32
In its release adopting Regulation ATS, the SEC noted that, although ATSs are
markets, the SEC historically regulated them as traditional broker-dealers, result-
ing in certain regulatory gaps.2 33 Specifically, for ATSs with significant trading
volume, a traditional broker-dealer regulatory approach did not provide investors
with access to the best prices, failed to provide a complete audit trail or adequately
surveil trading on alternative trading systems, and created the potential for market
disruption due to system outages.2 34 By adopting Regulation ATS, the SEC sought
to close these regulatory gaps.
Under Regulation ATS, most ATSs must choose whether to register as a broker-
dealer pursuant to section 15 of the Exchange Act and comply with Regulation ATS
or register as a national securities exchange under section 6 of the Exchange Act
and undertake the many self-regulatory functions that accompany exchange reg-
istration (e.g., Island or Archipelago Exchange).235 ATSs that exercise self-regulatory
powers, such as regulating its members or subscribers' conduct outside its trading
system, must register as an exchange or be operated by a national securities asso-
ciation. Also, if a dominant ATS exceeds certain preestablished volume thresholds,
the SEC has authority to determine that it must register as an exchange.
Regulation ATS imposes additional obligations on ATSs that have substantial
trading volume, but choose to register as broker-dealers instead of exchanges. For
example, if an ATS has 5 percent or more of the trading volume in any exchange-
listed or Nasdaq security, it must link with the exchange or Nasdaq and publicly
display its best priced orders (including institutional orders) for those exchange-
listed securities. In addition, such an ATS must allow members of the registered
232. Id. at 30,507 n.130.
233. Id. at 30,490.
234. Id. at 30,491-94.
235, To date, only two ATSs have indicated a desire to be registered as an exchange. In December
2001, Island indicated that it will file for exchange registration. See Isabelle Clary, Fast-Growing Island
Closer To Exchange Filing, SEC, INDUS. NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001. Archipelago, in contrast, has chosen not
to actually apply directly for registration as a national securities exchange, but rather ally itself with
the PCX to create a new trading facility Id. On October 25, 2001, the SEC approved the PCX's proposal
to create the Archipelago Exchange (ArcaEx), which is the first fully open, fully electronic stock market
for NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq equities in the United States. As a facility of the PCX, ArcaEx will be
subject to the SEC's oversight and examination. In addition, the PCX will be fully responsible for all
activity that takes place through ArcaEx. Persons using ArcaEx will be subject to PCXE rules and
securities traded on ArcaEx will be subject to the PCX's listing standards. Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,983, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,225, 55,229 (Oct. 25, 2001).
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exchanges and Nasdaq to execute against those publicly displayed orders. If an
ATS has 20 percent or more of trading volume, it also must ensure that its au-
tomated systems meet certain capacity, integrity and security standards. Such an
ATS must also refrain from unfairly denying investors access to its systems.2 36
Significantly, ATSs that choose to register as broker-dealers under Regulation
ATS, instead of exchanges, are not obligated to impose substantive regulation on
traders or the issuers of securities traded in their markets. Also, as more trading
moves to ATSs, the importance of the exchanges as sources of liquidity could
diminish as could their leverage in imposing corporate governance on issuers.
Even if the exchanges remain able to impose such listing standards on issuers as
liquidity shifts to ATSs, increased competitive pressure could undermine the de-
sire and ability of these markets to establish and maintain corporate governance
listing standards.
2. Other Sources of Competitive Pressure
In addition to competing for order flow with ATSs, the NYSE and Nasdaq
increasingly lose order flow to broker-dealers that execute orders in-house (i.e.,
internalize order flow). Generally, internalization is the routing of orders by a
broker to a market-maker that is an affiliate of the broker. In the case of an
integrated broker-dealer, internalization occurs where the firm's broker routes
customer orders to its market-making desk for execution.2 37 Even if internalization
increases, however, it will likely not signal the demise of exchange-listing because
it depends on independent pricing information.2 8
The OTC market for exchange-listed securities, or the so-called "third market,"
presents further competition for trading in listed stocks. Third market-makers act
much like market-makers in Nasdaq securities, seeking orders of a few thousand
shares or fewer in the most active listed stocks from retail firms or discount
brokers. In 1989, the third market accounted for 3.2 percent of reported NYSE
share volume and 5 percent of reported trade volume. 23 9 By 1993, third market
volume had doubled to 7.4 percent of reported NYSE share volume and 9.3
percent of reported trade volume.240 More recently, in 2000, the third market
accounted for about 8 percent of reported NYSE share volume and about 11
percent of reported trade volume.24'
236. The fair access requirement only prohibits unfair discrimination among persons seeking ac-
cess. ATSs may establish fair and objective criteria for participation, such as creditworthiness, to
differentiate among potential participants.
237. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 42,450,65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,582
(Feb. 23, 2000).
238. Historically, market data on broker-dealer's internalization practices has not been readily avail-
able. The SEC's recently adopted rule, Exchange Act Rule 1 lAc-5, however, should make this infor-
mation more readily available. See Order Disclosure Release No. 43,590, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2518, at
*22-*23 (Nov. 17, 2000).
239. See MARKET 2000 STUDY, supra note 189, at 9.
240. See id.
241. See JB, Nasdaq Takes Another Step into Listed Arena with ECN Links, SEC. WK., June 19, 2000,
at 3; see also Jack Willoughby, Generation Gap, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1, 1999 (reporting that
"[in the first quarter of 119981, third-market trades represented about 16 percent of the trade reports
in NYSE and [Amex] stocks, . . . or 6 percent of total dollar volume.").
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In addition to the competition presented by third market-makers, the compet-
itive positions of the self-regulated markets are increasingly threatened by the
globalization of trading in U.S. securities. Rapid advancements in technology have
facilitated the trading of securities around the world. As a result, the securities of
hundreds of U.S. companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq are traded on foreign
stock exchanges.242 A significant portion of this trading occurs on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE).2 43 In addition to the LSE, the NYSE and Nasdaq compete
for capitalization value with exchanges in Paris, Tokyo and Germany 44 According
to one source, "[tlwenty-five years ago, the companies traded on the NYSE ac-
counted for [about 801 percent of the world's capitalization value."245 In 2000,
the North American region accounted for approximately 50 percent of the world's
capitalization value.
2 46
In its consideration of the Nasdaq application for registration as an exchange,
the SEC has indicated that a precondition to effectiveness of the registration is
the creation of a workable alternative display facility, that is, an alternative quo-
tation and transaction reporting facility for NASD members that will permit
market-makers to display bids and offers in Nasdaq securities. The facility also
will provide a market neutral linkage to the Nasdaq and other marketplaces, but
will not provide an execution service. The NASD has filed rules to create such
a facility2
47
Additionally, there is a view that the continuing market evolution has chal-
lenged the exchanges' ability to make available the complex arrangement of prod-
ucts and services that they have traditionally provided to issuers and other market
participants. Specifically, many of the services exchanges have historically been in
a unique position to provide-including clearing and settlement, market oversight
and regulation, brand recognition and market liquidity-are being increasingly
provided by other market participants. How well the exchanges will be able to
react to this evolution, and maintain their market share by continuing to list
issuers and execute trades, may help determine the continuing effectiveness of
exchanges in establishing corporate governance standards. 248
242. See MARKET 2000 STUDY, supra note 189, at 11-7.
243. See id; see also LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, SECONDARY MARKET FACT SHEET (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/market/pdfs/FstoOl 12.pdf; see also Sylvia Ascarelli
& Kate Kelly, Nasdaq, London Stock Markets Revive Talks of Possible Merger, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002,
at C12 (Nasdaq and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) have been considering a merger of equals to
permit trading of U.S. securities in Europe).
244. See NASDAQ, NASDAQ IN BLACK AND WHITE, SECTION 3: GLOBAL RANKING (2001), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/blackwhite.stm.
245. Noelle Knox, NYSE Expects More Foreign Stocks, AP ONLINE, Jan. 13, 1999; see also Len A.
Costa, They List in the United States But Trade at Home, FORTUNE, July 5, 1999, at 198.
246. See INT'L. FED'N OF STOCK EXCHs., EVOLUTION OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION BY TIME ZONE 73,
available at http://www.fibv.com (North America represented 51.9 percent of the market capitalization
in a comparison of the ten largest stock markets in the world).
247. See generally Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,156, 67 Fed. Reg.
388 (Dec. 14, 2001); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,501, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 500 (Mar. 4, 2002).
248. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'hara, Globalization, Exchange Governance, and the
Future of Exchanges, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 (Robert E. Litan &
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C. DEMUTUALIZATION
In its adopting release to Regulation ATS, the SEC laid the groundwork for
demutualization by expressing its view that registered exchanges may structure
themselves as for-profit organizations and that currently registered exchanges,
which are all membership organizations, could choose to demutualize by becom-
ing for-profit entities. 249 Shortly thereafter, responding to competitive pressures
from alternative market centers and abroad, both Nasdaq and the NYSE an-
nounced plans for public offerings that would make them for-profit entities.25 0
Although the NYSE subsequently reconsidered its plan to demutualize, the NASD
has proceeded with demutualization. By 2000, the NASD had sold approximately
40 percent of Nasdaq to investors in a private placement of securities. 25 The
NASD completed a second private placement of shares in Nasdaq inJanuary 2001,
and has committed to divest itself of its remaining shares of Nasdaq. 52
Since the NASD first announced its plans to demutualize the Nasdaq market,
controversy has hampered Nasdaq's efforts to become a for-profit exchange. As
early as 1999, when the demutualization plans were first announced, then SEC
Chairman Levitt cautioned that the possibility of for-profit exchanges raises a num-
ber of questions and some concerns, including "how ... conflicts of interest might
change or grow in a for-profit environment. "253 Given these conflicts of interest,
Chairman Levitt concluded in testimony before the Congress, "At a minimum, there
must be strict corporate separation of the self-regulatory role from the marketplace
it regulates[,]" 214 a view that was shared by other commentators. 25
Anthony M. Santomero eds., 1999); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'hara, Regulating Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999); see also
RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? (Oxford University Press 1998).
249. See Regulation ATS Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,880 (Dec. 8, 1998) (stating
that the SEC "believes that it is possible for a for-profit exchange to meet the standards set forth in
Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act").
250. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard A. Grasso,
Statement at Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Public Ownership of the U.S. Stock Markets
(Sept. 28, 1999), available at http://www.nyse.com/speech/NT000245A2.html (discussing the
NYSE's contemplation of demutualization and the benefits and implications of for-profit status). In
May 2000, the Pacific Stock Exchange became the first U.S. stock exchange to demutualize part of its
business. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 42,759, 2000 SEC LEXIS 928
(May 5, 2000).
251. See Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Completes the First Phase of its Private Placement (June
28, 2000), available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/new/pr2000/nesection.html (last visited June 2,
2002).
252. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8020, 8021
(Jan. 19, 2001). The investors in Nasdaq include all of Nasdaq's largest market-makers, issuers, over
50 percent of its membership, and several large institutional buy-side firms.
253. Concerning Market Structure Issues Currently Facing the Commission: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec., Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1999/
tsty2599.txt.
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Bloomberg L.P and Bloomberg Tradebook LLC, to Jonathan
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/10-131/foleyl.htm (arguing that if the SEC permits Nasdaq to become a demutualized
exchange Nasdaq "will owe duties to its shareholders, primarily driven by a desire to increase profits
and maximize share value, and under the Exchange Act it will owe duties to its members and to
investors.").
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Taking into consideration these views, demutualization by the self-regulated
markets could exacerbate concerns about the ability or willingness of self-
regulated markets to continue to develop and maintain high listing standards.
Traditionally, such concerns about self-regulation have been tempered by the ar-
gument that SROs have strong incentives to preserve their reputations as fair and
prestigious markets through requirements such as corporate governance listing
standards.2 56 However, where such standards are unpopular with an SRO's listed
issuers, they could present a distinct challenge to markets operating as for-profit
entities.
Nevertheless, Nasdaq has made an application to the SEC for registration as a
national securities exchange, which is currently pending.25 7 Approval of the ap-
plication (and, consequently, Nasdaq's demutualization) has been conditioned by
the SEC on various factors, including (i) the separation in ownership of Nasdaq's
for-profit market functions (e.g., the listing and delisting of issuers) from its self-
regulatory functions (e.g., the regulation of members) and (ii) the creation by the
NASD of a residual OTC (ROTC) market to replace Nasdaq as a market for un-
listed securities. As of this date, Nasdaq has entered into a long-term contract
with the NASD to provide Nasdaq with self-regulatory services after demutuali-
zation is complete. Whether these demands and others will sufficiently guard
against the potential conflicts of interest arising from the establishment of a for-
profit securities exchange is yet to be seen.
SECTION IV.
GOVERNANCE REGULATION AND PRACTICES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
This section compares certain systemic differences between the U.S. hybrid
system of regulation and corporate governance listing standards with the corpo-
rate governance regimes in seven other jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, Poland, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and Brazil. In each of these countries,
corporate governance standards are derived from four potential sources: corporate
law, securities law, voluntary corporate governance codes and listing standards.
A. CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES
1. Concentrated Ownership and Control
In many foreign jurisdictions, corporate ownership is much more highly con-
centrated than in the United States. In much of Europe outside the United King-
256. See Karmel, supra note 75, at 329-30.
257. Presently, because Nasdaq is operated by the NASD, it is exempt from the definition of ex-
change and does not require registration as a national securities exchange under section 6 of the
Exchange Act. Accordingly, the SEC must approve Nasdaq's application as a national securities ex-
change before Nasdaq can be fully divested from the NASD. Although Nasdaq submitted its application
for such registration to the SEC on November 9, 2000, it was incomplete; Nasdaq's completed ap-
plication was officially filed on March 15, 2001. See The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.; Notice of Filing
of Application for Registration as a National Securities Exchange Under Section 6 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 44,396, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1097, at *1 n.2 (June 7,
2001) [hereinafter Notice of Filing of Nasdaq's Application Release].
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dom, large banking institutions combine their direct stockholdings with those of
investment companies controlled by them and holdings voted on behalf of their
brokerage customers to exert great influence over corporate managers. 2 58 In many
Asian jurisdictions, corporations are characterized by family ownership (e.g.,
Korean chaebols) or by a parent-subsidiary structure using cross-shareholding
among conglomerate members (e.g., Japanese keiretsu).25 Government ownership
of large blocks of shares, even after privatization, can also be found in a number
of jurisdictions.26
2. Capital Raising
Whereas U.S. corporations tend to "collect capital directly from the public"
through the financial markets, their European and Asian counterparts "collect
capital primarily through banks.' '261 In such foreign jurisdictions, contractual
lending arrangements and highly concentrated ownership give banks the ability
to monitor and control corporate managers beyond that of the relatively dispersed
U.S. shareholders which are in a market-based corporate governance system.2 62
3. Culture
In many foreign jurisdictions, the corporation as a vehicle primarily for the
benefit of the shareholders is superseded by broader notions of the corporation's
relationship to society and the need to balance the interests of other stakeholders,
including employees, suppliers, customers and the public. As a result, many non-
U.S. corporate governance codes include stakeholder provisions that call on cor-
porate managers to take these varied interests into account in corporate decision
making.263 Related to this emphasis on stakeholders is the "relational" nature of
Asian culture, in which loyalty to friends and family is highly valued. Insiders,
which may include managers, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and
even regulators, are required to keep strictly confidential the internal affairs of the
258. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
AM. J. CoMP. L. 329, 340 (2001); THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca et al. eds.,
2001); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate
Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833, 836-37 (1998).
259. See Stijn Claessens et al., Who Controls East Asian Corporations-and the Implications for Legal
Reform, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Sept. 1999, at 2, available at http://www.
worldbank.org/html/fpd/notes/195/95claes.pdf; HONG KONG SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTANTS, 1997 COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE REPORTS (1998); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54J. FIN. 471 (1999).
260. In Singapore, as of the end of the 1980s, companies representing approximately 69 percent
of the assets and 75 percent of the profits of the Singaporean public market were government linked
companies (GLCs), in which the government directly or indirectly owned or controlled up to 70
percent of the stock. Mak Yuen Teen & Phillip H. Phan, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE:
CURRENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (1999) (prepared for the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Conference on "Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative
Perspective" held in Seoul from Mar. 3-5, 1999). Throughout the 1990s, the 70 percent ownership
was reduced through privatization; however, it remains in excess of 50 percent. Id.
261. See Visentini, supra note 258, at 836-37.
262. Each of these systems has its weaknesses, as recent corporate failures have made clear.
263. See infra note 264 and accompanying text (description of corporate governance codes).
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unit. Conflicts within the unit are resolved internally and confidentially through
arbitration, and disclosures of internal information to outsiders is regarded as a
betrayal of the unit's interests. Such tendencies help explain the historical lack
of independent directors and inadequate disclosure practices of many Asian
corporations. 
64
4. Legal System
Systemic differences among legal systems also present important contextual
differences. For example, compliance with corporate governance standards when
taking fundamental corporate actions in many European civil law jurisdictions
requires prior court approval, whereas compliance in common law jurisdictions
is often enforced retrospectively through litigation. In Asia, there is often only
limited development of certain Anglo-American corporate governance concepts,
such as the fiduciary duties of directors,2 65 and the government typically regulates
public corporations heavily Corporate governance listing standards are largely
nonexistent outside the United States.
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
The following summary and table compare NYSE qualitative listing standards
with those in the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Japan, Malaysia, South
Korea and Brazil.
1. Audit Committees
Outside the United States, audit committee requirements are generally included
in nonbinding corporate governance codes. The U.K. Combined Code recom-
mends that each U.K. listed company establish an audit committee consisting of
at least three directors, a majority of whom should be "independent non-executive
directors." The German Cromme Commission Code recommends that companies
establish an audit committee consisting of supervisory board members. The Re-
vised Japanese Corporate Governance Principles recommend that an audit com-
mittee be created within a company's board of directors and be comprised of
majority of non-executive directors.2 66 Once this takes place, companies would
be allowed to eliminate the statutory board of auditors. 67 The Kuala Lumpur
264. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, A CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING IN EAST ASIA 4-5 (2000).
265. See CALLY JORDAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: EvI-
DENCE OF THE IMPACT AND CURRENT TRENDS 5 (1999) (quoting from a recent OECD conference, "To
drop a concept such as the fiduciary duty of directors into a legal system which does not have the
trust as an underlying fundamental legal institution... is dropping the concept into the void.").
266. JAPAN CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., REVISED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 14 (2001),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country-documents/japan/revised-corporategovernance-
principles.pdf. These Principles have not yet been adopted by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
267, This would require a change in the commercial code that currently requires a Board of
Statutory Auditors. Alternative proposals would expand the independence of the Board of Statutory
Auditors.
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Stock Exchange Revamped Listing Requirements were issued in 2001 and require
listed companies to establish audit committees comprised primarily of indepen-
dent directors, with one member to be a qualified Malaysian accountant. 268 The
Korean Code of Best Practice recommends that boards establish and maintain an
audit committee consisting of at least three directors, two-thirds of whom (in-
cluding the chairperson) should be "outside directors" and at least one of whom
should be a person "possessing professional knowledge of auditing."269 Audit com-
mittees are not addressed by any source of governance standards in either Poland
or Brazil.
2. Shareholder Approval
The NYSE and Nasdaq require shareholder approval for certain issuances of
securities that are not generally required with state corporate law. In jurisdictions
outside the United States, shareholder approval requirements are generally ad-
dressed solely in the corporation law. The U.K. Companies Act requires U.K.
companies to grant preemptive rights to its shareholders upon any issuance of
equity for cash. A majority of shareholders can waive these rights with respect to
a specific issuance or at an annual meeting with respect to a specific kind of
issuance (e.g., acquisitions). Additionally, the U.K. Financial Services Authority
(FSA) listing rules require shareholder approval of all option plans and stock
issuances to insiders.
In Germany, the Stock Corporation Act (SCA) requires shareholder approval
prior to stock issuances. Furthermore, the SCA grants all shareholders automatic
preemptive rights upon all share issuances, which rights can be waived only by
a two-thirds vote of shareholders. The SCA also recommends general shareholder
approval for a "contingent capital increase" to issue options or shares to directors
and employees as future compensation.
The Polish Commercial Code, the South Korean Commercial Code and the
Brazilian Corporation Law each permits boards to issue shares freely up to a
company's authorized capital without shareholder approval. In all three jurisdic-
tions, however, shareholder approval is required to increase a company's author-
ized capital.27 ° The Polish Commercial Code also grants all shareholders automatic
preemptive rights upon new issuances of shares, which rights can be waived only
by a vote of 80 percent of the votes cast at a shareholders' meeting.271
The Korean Securities and Exchange Act requires specific shareholder approval
of option plans. The Korean Best Practice Code recommends that "shareholders
268. KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS § 15.10 (2001), available at http://
www.klse.com.my/website/documents(KLSE.ListReq200l .pdf.
269. SOUTH KOREAN COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 111.1.2 (1999) [hereinafter SOUTH KOREAN CODE OF BEST PRACTICESI.
270. The Polish Commercial Code limits the amount of shares a company can authorize but not
issue to 75 percent of the outstanding share capital. See THE POLISH CODE OF COMMERCIAL PARTNER-
SHIPS AND COMPANIES arts. 444, 448 (Warsaw 2001).
271. The Polish Commercial Code permits the waiver of preemptive rights with respect to a specific
share issuance or as part of the authorization of additional capital. See id. arts. 433, 447 (Pol.).
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be allowed to make decisions directly on issues which carry weighty influence on
the corporation's very existence and the rights of shareholders."
272
In Japan, the Corporate Governance Principles call for a more proactive role
for shareholder meetings. Historically, most Japanese companies held their share-
holder meetings on the same day, significantly reducing attendance; the Principles
would change that.273 In Japan, shareholder activism is a recent phenomenon;
Japanese institutional investors are only now beginning to vote their shares.
The listing rules of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange were recently amended
to require approval by a majority of the disinterested shareholders of related party
transactions of a certain size.274 The Malaysian Companies Act requires share-
holder approval for the disposal of property to directors and for the issuance of
shares to directors.2
7 5
3. Voting Rights
The U.K. Companies Act permits the issuance of nonvoting or restricted voting
ordinary and preference shares without limitation, unlike the NYSE and Nasdaq.
Although the U.K. Combined Code does not address voting rights, other U.K.
governance codes2 76 recommend that all ordinary shares have equal voting rights.
Neither of these codes, however, is incorporated into the comply or explain reg-
ulatory framework applicable to companies listed on the LSE (or other relevant
U.K. exchange).
While the German Stock Corporation Act permits the issuance of nonvoting
preferred shares, it mandates a one share, one vote rule for ordinary shares. The
German Cromme Commission Code also states that each share should carry
one vote and that there should be no shares with multiple voting or preference
voting rights.
The Polish Commercial Code also permits the issuance of nonvoting preferred
shares but mandates a one share, one vote rule for ordinary shares of public
companies. Similarly, the Korean Commercial Code permits the issuance of non-
voting preferred shares, but mandates a one share, one vote policy for common
shares. The Code of Best Practice supplements the Korean Commercial Code by
recommending that all shares have equal voting rights (notwithstanding the pro-
vision permitting the issuance of nonvoting preferred shares) absent extenuating
circumstances. The principle of one share, one vote has also been established in
Malaysia and Japan.
272. SOUTH KOREAN CODE OF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 269, § 1.1.2.
273. JAPAN CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES: A JAPANESE VIEW
(FINAL REPORT) 53 (1998), available at http://wb-cu.car.chula.ac.th/papers/corpgov/cg073.taf.
274. KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note 268, § 10.08.
275. Malaysian Companies Act of 1965 §§ 132C, 132D (2000).
276. See WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, EUROPEAN COMM'N, INTERNAL MKT. DIRECTORATE GEN.,
DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
ITS MEMBER STATES, ANNEX IV, 247-50, 258-62 (2002) (prepared in consultation with the European
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers & the European Corporate Governance Network), available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt.en.htm (PIRC
Shareholder Voting Guidelines and Hermes Statement).
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The issuance of shares with disparate voting rights is permitted under the Bra-
zilian Corporation Law; however, listing on the Novo Mercado requires adherence
to a covenant not to issue nonvoting shares.
4. Other Standards
While none of these jurisdictions has laws similar to the NYSE listing standard
against granting special rights to certain shareholders, the U.K. Combined Code,
the German Cromme Commission Code and the Korean Code of Best Practice
each identifies the importance of not disenfranchising shareholders as a funda-
mental policy While the securities law of each of the jurisdictions includes the
regulation of insider trading, the Korean Code of Best Practice supplements
Korean law in stating that "[sihareholders shall be protected from unfair
conduct[ I of insider trading and self-dealing."2 7 Likewise, the U.K. Combined
Code and the German Cromme Commission Code include general principles
regarding the duties of directors and officers that preclude insider trading and
guard against other conflicts of interest. The Brazilian Corporation Law has re-
cently broadened minority shareholder rights for both existing and newly issued
preferred shares, including caps on the issuance of nonvoting preferred shares,
the right of preferred shares to receive dividends or to receive tagalong rights in
a change of control event.2 8
The U.K. Companies Act, the German Securities Trading Act, the South Korean
Securities and Futures Commission regulations, the Polish Securities Law, the
Malaysian Companies Act and the Brazilian Securities Commission Law require
the disclosure of transactions with related parties. In the United Kingdom, the
FSA listing rules provide that, subject to certain exceptions, any transaction with
a substantial shareholder or a director must be negotiated at arm's length, con-
summated at market terms and approved by disinterested shareholders not party
to the transaction. 79 The German Panel Code recommends that all related party
transactions be negotiated at arm's length, consummated at market terms ap-
proved by disinterested members of the supervisory board and suggests that com-
panies establish precautionary procedures regarding possible insider trading and
self-dealing by supervisory and management board members. The Tokyo Stock
Exchange prohibits certain related party transactions and has strengthened its
disclosure requirements. The Malaysian Companies Act has provisions preventing
certain types of self-dealings by directors. 2 0 The South Korean Best Practice Code
supplements the disclosure requirement of Korean law by stating that, "Share-
holders shall be protected from unfair conduct[ I of insider trading and self-
277. SOUTH KOREAN CODE OF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 269, § 1.2.3.
278. Namrata Savoor, Amendments to Brazilian Corporation Law Enhance Minority Shareholder Rights,
INT'L. SEC. OUTLOOK, Apr. 22, 2002, at 4.
279. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES § 11.4 (2000).
280. Malaysian Companies Act §§ 132E-132G, 133, 133A (2000). The Listing Requirements of the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange also requires disclosure of, in certain instances shareholder approval
of, related party transactions. KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note
268, § 10.08.
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dealing."28 Finally, the Brazilian Corporation Law imposes an additional duty on
controlling shareholders not to abuse control positions to the detriment of other
shareholders through transactions with the corporation.
With respect to defensive tactics, the German Cromme Commission Code ech-
oes the corresponding NYSE listing standard in stating that shareholders should
decide whether to accept or reject acquisition offers and that defensive tactics
should be taken only after consideration of the best interests of shareholders.
Similarly, the Korean Code of Best Practice advises directors not to engage in
defensive tactics that "involve sacrificing the profit of corporations and share-
holders to maintain corporate control for only some shareholders or manage-
ment."28 2 No other sources in any of the other jurisdictions analyzed address
standards applicable to defensive tactics in contests for corporate control.28 3
In each of the jurisdictions (except South Korea), corporation law requires that
annual meetings be held, while no source in any of the jurisdictions analyzed
imposes special quorum requirements or places restrictions on the classification
of boards of directors. Similarly, in none of the jurisdictions does corporation law
provide public companies with a mechanism for obtaining shareholder consents
in lieu of a shareholders' meeting, effectively prohibiting this practice. Corporation
law in each of the jurisdictions regulates the extent to which companies can
redeem or repurchase shares.
C. SOURCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
Corporate governance standards are derived from four potential sources: cor-
porate law, securities law, voluntary corporate governance codes and listing stan-
dards. The determination as to which source is used, and where it places em-
phasis, is a function of the particular conditions within each country. In many of
the Asian countries, for example, where transparency and protecting the rights of
individual minority shareholders were not historically viewed as essential, signifi-
cant pressure for change is coming from the governments. 28 4 In the United States,
this historically has in part been the responsibility of the exchanges (through their
listing standards). A table of specific sources of foreign corporate governance
standards is attached as Annex D.
281. Sour- KOREAN CODE OF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 269, § 1.2.3.
282. Id. § V 1.2.
283. The U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code), however, is an additional
source of guidance for public companies engaging in change of control transactions and includes
recommendations relating to defensive tactics. Although the Takeover Code is not binding law, U.K.
companies almost uniformly follow the rules proscribed therein when engaging in such transactions.
See THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE
RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES (6th ed. 2000).
284. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL TRENDS EXAMINED FROM AN ASIAN
PERSPECTIVE 12 (2001). Outside pressure from the World Bank and the OECD, together with the Asian
Financial Crisis, contributed to the pace of change in Asia.
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1. Corporate Laws and Securities Laws
While corporate laws and securities laws are wide in scope and establish a
range of regulatory requirements, they often are permissive, particularly when
corporate managers make a decision in the exercise of their business judgment
or shareholders approve a particular action. In addition, at least two European
Community (EC) directives require that EC Member States amend their national
laws to harmonize certain listing requirements.28
2. Corporate Governance Codes
Corporate governance codes have become nearly universal as a source of non-
binding governance standards. 28 6 Because corporate governance codes have no
legal force they do not require corporate managers to comply with the specified
governance practices. They are generally issued by bodies that are not regulatory
in nature, including government commissions; stock exchange committees; busi-
ness, industry and academic associations; and director and investor groups.
The U.K. Cadbury Report in 1992 was one of the first corporate governance
codes. Today there are close to 100 such codes, and they emanate from every part
of the world. 28 7 While most codes tend to be country-specific, in 1999 the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development adopted a set of general
principles for wide geographic application. The Commonwealth Association for
Corporate Governance and the International Corporate Governance Network
quickly followed with similarly broad statements of corporate governance prin-
ciples. Many of the guidelines included in these foreign codes address similar
issues as those addressed in the NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards. However the
foreign codes are much broader in scope.
Foreign corporate governance codes address a broad range of corporate gov-
ernance matters. For example, each of the U.K. Combined Code, the German
Cromme Commission Code, 288 the Japanese Corporate Governance Princi-
285. See Council Directive 80/390/EEC, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1 (Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars To Be Published for the Admission
of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, art. 54(3)(g) and 100); Council Directive 79/279/EEC,
1979 O.J. (L 66) 21 (Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock
Exchange Listing, art. 54(3)(g) and 100). These Directives deal with both disclosure requirements and
listing standards.
286. For a discussion of corporate governance codes in European Union Member States, see WEIL,
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, EUROPEAN COMM'N, INTERNAL Mit. DIRECTORATE GEN., COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES
(2002) (prepared in consultation with the European Ass'n of Sec. Dealers & the European Corporate
Governance Network), available at http://europa.eu.int/commlinternal market/en/company/company/
news/corp-gov-codes-rpt.en.htm.
287. According to the EC Corporate Governance Code Comparative Study, there are currently some
35 documents that constitute corporate governance codes applicable to issuers domiciled in various
EU member states. See id. at 2.
288. In Germany, as in most civil law countries, companies are governed by a two-tier board
structure, consisting of a supervisory board, charged with general strategic oversight of the company's
affairs, and a management board (usually consisting entirely of officers), which is responsible with the
day-to-day operation of the company
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ples,2 89 the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Principles and Best
Practices) , 290 the Korean Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance and the
Brazilian Code of Best Practice provides guidelines with respect to board com-
position and practices, a minimum number of directors that can be characterized
as independent of management, and any material relationship with the company
Each of these codes makes specific recommendations as to the disclosure to share-
holders of information regarding the corporation. Additionally, the U.K. Com-
bined Code provides that specific procedures of remuneration and nominating
committees be established; and the Japanese Principles separates the functions of
the board of directors from that of executive management. Finally, the Principles
and the South Korean Code each includes provisions encouraging management
to act in the interest of all corporate stakeholders. 291
3. Listing Standards
While in Europe exchange-listing agreements do not generally include corpo-
rate governance requirements, certain Asian stock exchanges have begun to in-
corporate corporate governance listing measures into their agreements. For ex-
ample, in addition to the nonbinding guidelines set forth in the Malaysian Code
of Best Practices, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange's listing rules include binding
requirements with respect to certain governance matters. 292 The Hong Kong Stock
Exchange also requires heightened corporate governance standards.
D. ENFORCEMENT
Compliance with corporate governance standards can be encouraged by aspir-
ational guidelines, the disciplining processes of the marketplace, actions taken by
the various exchanges and legal proceedings (civil or criminal). In the United
States and abroad, the corporate governance requirements in corporation and
securities laws are generally enforceable through legal and/or regulatory action.
289. The Japanese Corporate Governance Principles were adopted by the Corporate Governance
Forum of Japan, a corporate and academic non-governmental advisory group. While influential, their
goals are aspirational at best. The Principles recommend a number of changes that would be quite
significant to corporate Japan.
290. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Principles and Best Practices), first published
in 1999, includes 13 broad principles and 33 best practices. They, in combination with the Listing
Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, reflect the movement, common to a number of
Asian countries, from a merit-based regulatory framework to a disclosure-based framework. While
actual compliance with the Malaysian Code is technically voluntary, the listing rules also require
companies to make a number of expansive disclosures in their annual reports as to the state of their
compliance with the principles and best practices. The presence of these disclosure requirements is
(practically) forcing compliance by companies. Failure to make those disclosures or making a false or
misleading disclosure can result in serious penalties, including delisting, fines, and jail sentences.
291. For example, the Japanese Principles indicates that directors bear "the important responsibility
of coordinating the various interests of all the other stakeholders." CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 273, at 46 (Principle 4A). Likewise, the South Korean Code states that a "corporation
shall not be negligent in its social responsibilities, such as consumer protection and environmental
protection." SOUTH KOREAN CODE OF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 269, § IV 1.3.
292. See KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note 268, at ch. 2.
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As a result, enforcement is a function both of the capability and will of the gov-
ernment or shareholders to act. In some countries, the government itself has been
and continues to be a stakeholder (and sometimes a shareholder) in numerous
companies raising practical difficulties with respect to enforcement. Civil law
countries often have an additional enforcement mechanism whereby many cor-
porate actions only become effective after a court has determined that the action
was taken in compliance with the relevant statutory provisions. In jurisdictions
where class actions and derivative litigation are allowed, the private bar can be a
powerful incentive for compliance. 293
An additional complication in the international context relates to the difficulty
in enforcing compliance across borders. For example, the typical U.S. investor
faces significant burdens trying to litigate in foreign jurisdictions. In addition, the
kind of plaintiffs' bar that exists in the United States that brings these cases does
not exist abroad. Nor are U.S. attorneys typically willing to move offshore to bring
their cases due to the significantly higher costs and potentially lower returns.
In contrast, market participants are strong encouragers of compliance. The
rapid movement toward adoption of improved corporate governance standards
in Asia in the late 1990s was in part a reaction to the need for foreign capital.
Just recently, CalPERS announced that it was pulling its investments out of three
Asian markets (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) after giving them low marks
on either or both of market and country factors.2 94
As described above, corporate governance codes play an increasingly important
role in encouraging compliance with corporate governance standards. Although
they are largely aspirational and, as such, are not legally enforceable, the standards
set forth in corporate governance codes increasingly influence corporate behavior
due to the significant economic power of investor groups in the capital markets
and the voting power associated with their holdings. In addition, many corporate
governance codes suggest that companies disclose their level of compliance. More-
over, at least six countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Italy, Malaysia
and Australia, have incorporated such disclosure requirements into their regula-
tory regime. Most notably, since the early 1990s, the U.K. listing rules (now
293. Class actions and derivative litigation historically have not been available in much of Asia in
a form that provides significant benefit to the shareholders. However, the Supreme People's Court in
China, while expressly saying that class actions would not be allowed in the context of a securities
fraud case, recently suggested that shareholders can file collective actions in cases involving civil rights
violations in the securities market. Accordingly, the Harbin Intermediate People's Court recently ac-
cepted a case in which a Beijing lawyer, as counsel to over 400 shareholders of a Shanghai-listed
company (Daqing Lianyi), alleged that the company had made insufficient disclosure. See Shao Zong-
wei & Zhou Wanfeng, Court Takes Fraud Case, CHINA DAILY (Hong Kong Ed.), Jan. 26, 2002, at 4.
Singapore also recently amended its corporation law to permit shareholder derivative actions, and
Malaysia and Korea are considering amending their relevant codes to include specific authorization
of class action lawsuits. See The Singapore Companies Act §§ 216A, 216B (2002).
294. CaIPERS also does not invest in other emerging markets that do not meet its standards for
regulation, liquidity, openness, settlement and costs, such as India and China. See Cathy Holcombe
et al., U.S. Pension Fund Quits Four Problem Asian Markets, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 2002,
at 1.
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enforced by the FSA) have included a comply or explain requirement. 295 Listed
companies must disclose their compliance with the U.K. Combined Code (pre-
viously the Cadbury Code) and explain any areas of noncompliance. A violation
of this disclosure requirement could lead to delisting. Accordingly, although com-
pliance with the substantive guidelines of the U.K. Combined Code is voluntary,
the majority of U.K. listed companies comply in all substantive respects.
E. FOREIGN MARKET CHANGE
The continuing fragmentation and demutualization of foreign securities mar-
kets has a potential impact on corporate governance in these jurisdictions.
1. Fragmentation
Similar to the effect of the proliferation of ATSs in the United States, many
foreign jurisdictions are experiencing the increasing fragmentation of their tradi-
tional securities markets. In order to provide access to capital for higher risk
companies, many Asian countries have opened markets intended to fill Nasdaq's
historical role as a market for emerging issuers.196 These specialized markets have
been designed to avoid the quantitative listing standards of the local traditional
exchanges, but also generally incorporate less stringent corporate governance
standards due to the perception that strong corporate governance standards are
more costly for new companies.
Conversely, the SAo Paulo Stock Exchange, or Novo Mercado, has moved in
the opposite direction by initiating an alternative exchange-based corporate gov-
ernance regime. In an effort to "better advertise[ I] the efforts of [issuers] to improve
relations with Itheiri investors and increase[ I the potential for appreciation in
the value of its asset,"2 97 the Novo Mercado invited issuers to seek inclusion in
one of three special tiers marked by increasingly rigorous corporate governance
rules.298 Issuers failing to meet the requirements of their tier may be subject to
295. See U.K.L.A. LISTING RULES, supra note 6, § 12.43A(a)-(b). As noted above, the recently
adopted German Transparency and Disclosure Law sets forth a binding comply or explain requirement
for public issuers with respect to the provisions of the German Cromme Commission Code. See
German Corporate Governance Code § 3.10, available at http://www.corporate-govemance-code.de/
eng/kodex/3.html; see also supra Table: Corporate Governance Standards in Comparative Perspective
n.3. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange also requires disclosure as to compliance or noncompliance, but
it does not take the additional step of requiring disclosure as to how the company has complied with
the principles contained in the Code. The Korean Code of Best Practice recommends that issuers
disclose their level of compliance and explain any areas of noncompliance, however, South Korea has
codified this suggestion in binding law.
296. Hong Kong (Growth Enterprise Market), South Korea (Kosdaq), Singapore (Sesdaq), Malaysia
(Mesdaq) and Japan (Jasdaq) have all opened within the past three years. In Japan, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange opened the "Market of the High Growth and Emerging Stocks" or Mothers market in De-
cember of 1999. The bursting of the technology bubble in the United States and the recession that
followed slowed the growth of these new markets.
297. BOVESPA: SAO PAULO STOCK EXCHANGE, DIFFERENTIATED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE
RULES 3 (2001).
298. The corporate governance criteria of the three tiers relate to, among other things, public float,
increased public disclosure, use of GAAP and the treatment of minority shareholders upon a change
of control. BOVESPA-BRAZIL, Novo MERCADO, LISTING RULES 3.1(vii), (viii) (2002).
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fines and/or non-cash penalties, including the suspension or cancellation of the
issuers' inclusion in the given tier. If an issuer's inclusion in a tier is cancelled,
controlling shareholders are obligated to make a public offer to acquire all out-
standing shares held by other shareholders at a purchase price determined by an
outside appraisal. 299 Even the voluntary movement to a lower tier requires both
shareholder approval and a tender offer for all outstanding shares by controlling
shareholders.
2. Demutualization
While Nasdaq's demutualization is in progress, exchanges in Frankfurt, Stock-
holm, Amsterdam, Australia, London, Hong Kong and Singapore have recently
completed their demutualization, which has also frequently led to consolidation
among markets. For example, exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris have
recently combined to form Euronext; the Singapore Stock Exchange has an ex-
isting alliance with the Australian Stock Exchange and has recently announced
plans to pursue such a linkage with the Tokyo Stock Exchange; and the Hong
Kong Exchange is currently expanding its linkages with the Chinese exchanges.
The demutualization of foreign exchanges has raised the conflict of interest
concerns articulated by the SEC with respect to Nasdaq's planned demutualiza-
tion.300 The response of foreign regulators to these developments has generally
been the same as that of the SEC. In the United Kingdom, for example, regulators
sought to avoid these conflicts of interest by shifting authority over corporate
governance listing standards from a demutualized LSE to the FSA. 301 In Australia,
the conflicts of interest were deemed less severe when the Australian Stock Ex-
change (ASX) voted to demutualize. Accordingly, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission assumed direct listing authority over the ASX, as a listed
issuer of securities, but permitted the ASX to retain listing authority over all other
listed issuers.3"2 As demonstrated by the demutualization of Nasdaq, the LSE and
the ASX, the regulatory solution to demutualization "may lie in creating and main-
taining a sufficient degree of separation between the market-place and the
299. As of March 2001, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown estimated that approximately 51 Brazilian
issuers were eligible for inclusion in the least stringent tier; approximately 30 issuers were eligible for
inclusion in the next stringent tier; and approximately six issuers were eligible for inclusion in the
Novo Mercado. Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, Latin America Strategy, Brazil: Focusing on Corporate Gov-
ernance (Mar. 5, 2001). As of December 13, 2001, only 19 issuers had executed contracts to enter the
least stringent category; as of December 13, 2001, no issuers had entered either of the two more
stringent categories.
300. See Concerning Market Structure Issues Currently Facing the Commission, supra note 253,
301. See LONDON STOCK EXcHANGE, ADMISSION AND DISCLOSURE STANDARDS (2001), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about/pdfs/admiss standards-2002.pdf. The LSE has retained
authority to determine whether issuers meet the quantitative requirements that make them "eligible
for trading."
302. Jillian Segal, Market Demutualisation and Privatisation: The Australian Experience, Address at
the 26th IOSCO Annual Conference, Stockholm (June 28, 2001), available at http://www.asic.gov.
au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/IOSCOSpeechJune2001 .pdf/$file/IOSCOSpeechJune2001.pdf.
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exchange's regulatory units or in hiving off some regulatory functions to the
lead regulator.
303
Consideration of corporate governance regulation and practices outside the
United States is helpful for comparative purposes. In general, the majority of the
substantive matters covered by NYSE corporate governance listing standards are
addressed in each of the analyzed jurisdictions, whether by direct government
regulation, nonbinding corporate governance codes or exchange-established list-
ing standards. Therefore, to the extent corporate governance listing standards in
the United States address matters relevant to the integrity of securities markets,
each of the analyzed jurisdictions do so as well. However, with few exceptions
(including the recent corporate governance initiatives of the Brazilian Novo Mer-
cado), foreign exchanges generally do not set corporate governance standards for
listed issuers.
SECTION V
ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVES
A. ANALYSIS
The role of exchanges and the SEC in corporate governance is best viewed from
the perspective of the unique corporate governance system in the United States.
Each state establishes corporate law and its judiciary interprets that law. This
process provides minimal standards of conduct for corporations and their officers,
directors and shareholders and allocates power among shareholders, directors and
management.3 0 4 State corporate law, however, is not as a general matter directly
concerned with issues affecting the public markets for securities and the related
needs and interests of public securities holders. The federal securities laws provide
another regulatory layer but do not, in general, address rules of corporate conduct
affecting the marketplace, except as to matters such as disclosure and fraud. While
qualitative corporate governance listing standards initially were adopted for the
branding and related marketing purposes of the NYSE, they have evolved in part
to fill a gap between state corporate law and the federal securities laws in matters
of concern to the exchanges, namely, the operation of securities markets with
selective but high governance and fairness standards for listed companies.
To date, the governance initiatives of the exchanges have been selective. There
are twelve corporate governance listing standards of the NYSE, of which only two
have been adopted in the last eight years.3 05 In 1994 the uniform voting rights
listing standard was adopted by the NYSE, Nasdaq and the Amex and in 1999
audit committee listing standard amendments were adopted by the exchanges.
The most recent effort by shareholders to have the NYSE and Nasdaq adopt a
listing standard requiring shareholder approval of broad-based option plans and
303. Gwen Thomas, Stock Exchanges, ATSs and Privatisation: The Regulatory Reaction to Growing
Competition from On-line Securities Trading, SEC. & BANKING, Dec. 23, 1999.
304. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
305. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, §§ 302.00, 303.01,304.00, 306.00,307.00, 308.00,309.00,
310.00, 311.00, 312.03, 312.07, 313.00, 314.00.
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establishing a dilution standard has been controversial and thus far unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, Chairman Pitt's letter to the NYSE and Nasdaq of February 12, 2002
strongly recommends that the exchanges strengthen listing standards and enu-
merates a number of possible areas of focus. In an April 11, 2002 letter, Nasdaq
responded with a variety of suggestions.3 0 6 It is therefore likely that there will be
accelerated initiatives to use listing standards to remedy perceived governance
deficiencies in publicly-owned companies. This, in turn, raises two issues: the
legal limitations on the authority of the SEC and the exchanges to approve or
adopt particular corporate governance listing standards and the appropriate role
of the SEC and the exchanges in corporate governance generally
As discussed earlier in this report, the Business Roundtable decision is the sole
judicial holding that deals directly with the authority of the SEC and the exchanges
in relation to corporate governance. Significantly, the court found that corporate
governance listing standards are "rules" under the Exchange Act and therefore
require approval, or no disapproval, by the SEC before they can become effective.
Furthermore, since these rules affect issuers and not members, the SEC's authority
to approve a governance standard is limited, but the limitations are not defined.
The court said the Congress had not intended that state corporate law could be
preempted on a comprehensive basis through the use by the SEC of the listing
standard mechanism. Under section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC would
need to find consistency with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules
and regulations thereunder applicable to the SRO to justify approval of an
exchange-initiated governance listing standard.
The authority of the exchanges and the SEC to establish or approve further
corporate governance listing standards is uncertain and if challenged likely will
be decided on a case-by-case basis. For example, we believe that the statutory test
of "consistent with the requirements" is satisfied with respect to the audit com-
mittee listing standards, given the provisions of the Exchange Act that relate to
internal accounting controls and audited financial statements.3 0 7 It is unlikely that
existing corporate governance listing standards could be overturned at this junc-
ture, although they could be subject to collateral attack in the event of a delisting
proceeding. 3 8
Exchanges operate securities markets and they have a bona fide interest in the
standards of conduct of listed companies, including fairness to investors. They
have the right to establish quantitative and qualitative standards for their respec-
tive markets. While exchanges are competitive, it is generally acknowledged that
a "race to the bottom" from a governance listing standard perspective would be
unacceptable as a matter of national policy Furthermore, there is a view that
306. See Letter from Hardwick Simmons, supra note 104; see also Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, SEC
Chairman, to Richard Grasso, NYSE Chairman and Chief Executive Director and Hardwick Simmons,
Nasdaq Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with the Special Study Group);
Press Release, SEC, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate Governance, Conduct Codes (Feb. 13, 2002),
available at http://www, sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt.
307. See Exchange Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)(2000); id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
308. See Michael, supra note 13, at 1498.
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compliance with high standards can favorably affect the price of an issuer's se-
curities as well as the prestige of the exchange-the so-called "branding" effect.
There are many positive features to the role of the exchanges in terms of cor-
porate governance. The exchanges are able to interpret listing standards and ne-
gotiate with issuers with respect to compliance. In practice, this is effective since
most companies and their directors do not wish to become the subject of a public
controversy as to noncompliance, even though delisting is rarely used. The staff
at each of the principal markets spends a good deal of time in dealing with issuers
on these matters.
When governance listing standards, including amendments, are proposed, pub-
lication for comment often results in debate and controversy among shareholder
groups, issuers, regulators and the exchange itself. While issuers have significant
influence on exchange-listing standards policy, in this area shareholder activism
and the SEC provide the additional participation necessary for a useful forum on
corporate governance key issues. The exchanges also seek advice from legal and
other experts on the subject matter of corporate governance standards, which
adds significantly to their capability This forum approach is constructive in that
it frequently results in a collaborative solution, and, at a minimum, establishes
publicly the points of view of interested participants. This feature should be pre-
served despite any future systemic change.
Not all aspects of corporate governance are relevant to the interests of the
exchanges in operating securities markets; nor do the exchanges have the au-
thority or the expertise to act as arbiters on a full range of corporate governance
matters. While it is difficult to define with precision the appropriate interest of
the exchanges, it should substantively relate to the operation of securities markets
so as to promote investor confidence and provide reliability
Listing standards are not the only source of rules respecting governance outside
of state corporate law. Corporate governance codes of different kinds have pro-
liferated throughout the world. Many of them are comprehensive. However,
the best practices guidelines contemplated by the Proposal should be limited to
the corporate governance areas that are necessary for and directly relevant to the
maintenance of integrity in the securities markets and fairness to investors.
In light of recent widely publicized corporate failures, the issue of defining the
most effective approach to improving corporate governance as it affects markets
is squarely presented at this time. It is not necessary or even desirable to redesign
the current system to achieve ongoing improvement in the process. Improvement
should be built on the strengths of the existing system. Any significant change in
the system creates the potential of new risks to the capital markets, issuers and
investors, and should only be established after careful and focused study Any
systemic change should take into account the role of state corporate law in gov-
ernance, corporate governance codes and practices and the appropriate areas of
concern to and interest of the exchanges.
For all of these reasons, and in light of this analysis, we recommend the
Proposal as a most appropriate response to current governance needs. An analysis
of the alternatives without active exchange participation further supports this
conclusion.
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B. ALTERNATIVES
We have considered various alternatives. These may be applicable in two events:
(i) primary exchanges are unable to continue a meaningful role in the corporate
governance process principally because changes in the securities markets limit
their influence through the use of listing standards and best practices; or (ii) a
primary exchange elects, for whatever reason, not to maintain its involvement in
the corporate governance process on a comprehensive basis. In either such event,
with the absence of a prominent and influential role for the exchanges, corporate
governance measures may need to be addressed through other means. Set forth
below is a brief description of the principal alternatives we have considered:
1. Unofficial Codes
Without the active participation of the exchanges, there could be a meaningful
loss of structure in connection with the adoption, amendment, repeal and inter-
pretation of the provisions that currently are the subject of listing standards or
best practices guidelines. In any event, nonbinding corporate governance codes
should continue to be available for use by issuers. Should the SEC adopt a dis-
closure rule respecting governance practices, transparency with respect to gov-
emance matters would increase.
Absent, however, would be some structure to provide uniformity for, and the
means of, adopting, amending, interpreting and repealing the various codes. This
might be achieved through one or more entities established by the private sector
which could seek to assume primary responsibility for governance matters. Pre-
sumably, such an entity would sponsor dialogue among shareholder groups, is-
suers, regulators and other interested parties respecting governance matters. If
the private sector is unable or fails to provide the necessary structure to satisfy
the needs of issuers and investors, the SEC could become more directly involved
or one of the other alternatives described below may be adopted.
In recommending the desirability of some structure to the process, we are
mindful of the fact that many issuers deem the maintenance of good governance
practices as desirable partly as a result of the influence of shareholder groups and
the SEC. Furthermore, current events affecting corporate governance could in-
creasingly persuade boards of directors to enhance their governance practices and
corporate transparency, thereby facilitating a "flight to quality."
2. State Corporate Law
Alternatively, state corporate law could be strengthened with respect to gov-
ernance matters to the extent the exchanges become unable or unwilling to main-
tain their role with respect to corporate governance. It is doubtful, however, state
action could be coordinated on a uniform basis. Additionally, state corporate law
is enforced in court and provides a very cumbersome mechanism for uniform
interpretation or exemption. Moreover, state corporate law normally is not
changed promptly nor does it ordinarily address current issues affecting the in-
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tegrity of the public markets and the protection of public investors. For all of
these reasons, we believe, reliance on state law would be insufficient.
3. Expand SEC Authority
The authority of the SEC to approve or impose corporate governance listing
standards or their equivalent could be increased or clarified by legislation. SEC
authority over corporate governance measures could extend both to issuers whose
securities are listed on an exchange and those who are not listed but whose
securities are publicly traded. Such an approach, however, would clearly federalize
significant aspects of corporate law. To the extent that the listing process continues
in its present form, the expansion of SEC authority by legislation could reverse
or revise elements of the Business Roundtable decision, or establish a new approach
to the SEC role in corporate governance. This would involve a significant change
in the system with far-reaching consequences for the current balance between
federal and state regulation. We believe that the longstanding controversy as to
the desirability of federalizing significant aspects of corporate law need not be
revisited at this time. Private initiatives are better suited to the task under current
circumstances.
4. Special Entity
A special SRO-type entity could be authorized by an act of Congress. While
the activities of such an entity would not be regulatory in nature, its purpose
would be to fill a void in the governance process. It could be authorized to
establish or recommend corporate governance requirements applicable to public
issuers or identify corporate governance codes which may be applicable to public
companies. Presumably, it would have an independent staff and funding and
would be subject to SEC oversight. Its role in the governance process would need
to be carefully defined including any interpretive authority, whether it should be
limited to defining best practices, and the consequences to issuers who fail to
adopt its recommended practices. The independence of this entity and the role
of the SEC would also have to be defined.
We do not suggest that the establishment of such an entity would be a suitable
substitute for the exchanges which have a business incentive to maintain the
integrity of the markets and provide for the fair treatment of investors. An SRO-
type entity would be more quasi-governmental in nature but without delegated
federal authority. In addition, the governance of this entity could involve sub-
stantial issues of federalization of areas of corporate law. The only historic model
for such an entity is the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), which
was established by the 1975 Amendments to write rules related to municipal
securities, but the MSRB is subject to significant SEC influence. We do not believe
that the MSRB is a suitable model for the oversight of corporate governance mat-
ters, which requires the willing participation of interested parties to be successful.
Finally, such an entity may not be in a position to build upon or take advantage
of the strengths of the existing system.
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Accordingly, we believe that the establishment of this type of entity is inadvis-
able and might not be the most effective means of dealing with issues of corporate
governance that continue to arise and are of increasing importance.
5. Other
There may be other alternatives to accomplish the objective of enhancing cor-
porate governance for the protection and interests of investors. One possibility is
that a rating system be adopted as part of one of the other programs so that an
independent rating agency or other entity is entitled to grade the corporate gov-
ernance compliance of the particular entity with the best practices. While we do
not recommend this process at this time, it is something that may materialize in
the future provided that the identity of the rater and the definition of the systems
for rating are clearly established and are impartial. Protection would need to be
applied to any such process to make certain that the system could not be abused
or be subject to the control or influence of particular groups that have a special
agenda. We do not pass upon the desirability of this process for corporate gov-
ernance generally Our focus is with respect to the securities markets and the
interests of investors as participants in those markets. The purpose of a rating
system would be to provide investors with a governance evaluation which is
comprehensive and fair and measured against objective criteria.
We recognize that a combination of these alternatives could be adopted in the
future. For the present, our recommendation is to adopt the best practices and
disclosure program and permit matters to evolve. Should there be shortcomings
as a result of experience, other alternatives may be considered.
CONCLUSION
The current environment provides an opportunity for the exchanges, with the
cooperation of their members, investors, issuers and the SEC, to improve cor-
porate governance practices as they relate to the protection of investors and the
integrity of the securities markets. With this in mind, as well as the need to
promote investor confidence, we have undertaken this Study and made a series
of recommendations, including the Proposal, for prompt action without signifi-
cant change in the existing system. We arrived at these recommendations after
identifying and considering various alternatives, the problems associated with
each of the alternatives and the risks associated with systemic change.
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ANNEX B
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS
As part of the study, separate interviews were conducted with representatives
of regulators, primary markets, alternative trading systems, investment banks and
institutional shareholders. The discussions were free-ranging, precise conclusions
were neither sought nor obtained and there was no effort to reach consensus on
issues. Many of the participants emphasized subject matter which was of partic-
ular interest to them. Many of the interviews took place before September 11,
2001 and therefore neither (i) the impact on the markets of damage from future
terrorist activities or other catastrophic events nor (ii) current accounting and
other irregularities and practices were reflected in most of these discussions. We
derived the following from the interviews:
1. The role of exchanges and particularly the increased use of corporate gover-
nance listing standards need to be clarified.
2. The full extent of authority of the SEC in this area is unclear but as a practical
matter the SEC can and does influence the adoption or amendment of cor-
porate governance listing standards by the exchanges.
3. The scope of corporate governance listing standards has yet to be determined
both as a legal matter and through the appropriate allocation of authority
among the states, the markets, the SEC, and the private sector.
4. There is concern about the potential federalization of aspects of corporate law
should the SEC or other federal agency assume expanded powers over cor-
porate governance through listing standards or otherwise. Listing standards
fill a gap between state law and the federal securities laws with respect to
important, but selective, matters of corporate governance.
5. Corporate governance listing standards constitute an opportunity for issuers
and institutional and other shareholders to communicate concerning gover-
nance issues. This is achieved through a "forum" provided by the primary
market.
6. Uniformity of such listing standards is desirable to avoid a "race to the bottom"
but there is some support for the notion that higher standards attract investors
and are part of the "branding" initiatives of the primary markets. However,
certain of the participants suggested that different issuers may appropriately
have different governance requirements and therefore uniformity may not be
desirable in many instances.
7. Overseas listing and globalized trading are a "work in progress" and over time
will have a significant impact on the U.S. markets and the corporate gover-
nance processes. Foreign markets may continue to have difficulty in applying
uniform standards notwithstanding many of the current initiatives in Europe
and elsewhere. The status of foreign issuers under the U.S. securities laws for
listing and trading purposes should be considered further as markets, systems,
regulatory structures, and investor safeguards change.
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8. Some believe that alliances and mergers between U.S. and foreign markets
are essential for the future. Others see a limited advantage for U.S. markets
to merge although alliances as well as consolidation abroad will continue.
9. Some participants endorsed the notion that a "best practices" approach could
be effective in place of certain corporate governance listing standards. This is
based on the premise that rarely is there a delisting because of noncompliance
with such listing standards. There is a market expectation that companies
will comply with acceptable, if not best, practices. Shareholder activism, the
need for market acceptance and the watchdog activities of the SEC and mar-
kets motivate listed companies to observe good governance practices.
10. While Regulation ATS does not require alternative trading systems to have
listings (and some believe the SEC may not currently have authority to
require them to do so), there are issues as to whether a market which
registers as an exchange needs listings and therefore listing standards. No
views were expressed as to whether corporate governance listing standards
would be required.
11. While many of the participants expressed individual views on the evolving
market structures and competition among exchanges and other market sys-
tems, the only broad consensus was that under current circumstances it was
not likely that there would be a near term liquidity shift. However, there were
diverse views on how, over time, the markets and regulation will adjust to
technological change and globalization. Further, some suggest market com-
petition could be significantly affected by a large technology company be-
coming a competitor, particularly in actively traded securities, although there
was no suggestion that this will occur in the foreseeable future, or regarding
what conditions the SEC might impose in such event.
12. Securities markets are a brand name business. Listings are important sources
of earnings to the markets but the fees represent a relatively low cost to the
issuer. Competition among markets will increase. Electronic trading will ac-
celerate. The NYSE and Nasdaq are adapting to technological change. The
advent of Archipelago Exchange may stimulate this process.
13. The alternatives to be considered should there be a change in the listing
process had not been the subject of meaningful thought by certain of the
participants. However, there was virtual unanimity that should listing dimin-
ish in importance for whatever reason the federal government would not
abide the elimination of corporate governance listing standards. The use of
best practices codes as a substitute for some or all corporate governance
listing standards had not been given extensive consideration but some par-
ticipants believe that certain existing standards could be replaced by a system
of best practices.
14. There were divergent views and uncertainty as to the regulation and self-
regulation of the markets in the future, particularly in relation to demutual-
ization and the need for transparency and best execution in the markets.
However, it was generally agreed that listing standards should be adopted
and administered by the markets and not by those responsible for regulation
or compliance.
1564 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 57, August 2002
15. The preemption of state blue sky laws under the federal securities laws is
based on listing and good governance. Should listings diminish, this pre-
emption would need to be reexamined.
16. Demutualization and shareholder ownership are considered likely for most
markets but it should be assumed the NYSE decision to remain member-
owned will remain unchanged for the present.
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ANNEX C
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE SEC,
THE NYSE AND NASDAQ
MARCH 13, 2002
SPECIAL STUDY
ON
MARKET STRUCTURE, LISTING STANDARDS
AND CORPORATE GOVERANCE
This memorandum has been prepared by a Special Study Group of the Com-
mittee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Business Law of the
American Bar Association. For the past sixteen months we have been engaged in
a study of the interrelationship of market structure, corporate governance and
listing standards. We have examined the background, nature and use of corporate
governance listing standards; the authority of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the exchanges to adopt them; the role of the exchanges fostering
improvement in corporate governance; the relationship of this process to state
corporate law and the federal securities laws; present and potential changes in
market structure; and governance practices and regulation abroad. Our report is
scheduled to be completed in the next two months and will contain an analysis
of these matters and alternatives to be considered for the future.
Based on our study to date, we believe any significant change in the current
system requires careful thought and discussion and would likely take place over
time. We have a specific recommendation with respect to an interim process
through which measures might be adopted and implemented to deal with gov-
ernance issues currently being considered by the Commission, the Congress, the
exchanges and others.
Over time and with Commission approval the exchanges have selectively
adopted corporate governance measures as listing standards. Many of these
governance standards have focused on matters that pertain to the integrity of the
securities markets and fairness to investors. Some overlap provisions of state
corporate law. The authority of the Commission and the exchanges to adopt
standards such as these in the future is uncertain. We discuss this at length in
our report.
We suggest, therefore, that the exchanges consider recommending a set of ap-
propriate best practices designed to deal with current issues in corporate gover-
nance, particularly as they pertain to the integrity of the markets and fairness to
investors. They should be broad in scope and flexible in relation to the circum-
stances of particular kinds of companies. These best practices would be endorsed
by the exchanges after soliciting the views of interested parties, including share-
holder groups, listed companies, the Commission and outside experts. They
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would not be binding and would not take the form of listing standards. Further,
we recommend that the Commission require annual disclosure by each listed
company in its periodic reports, proxy materials or other public filings as to
whether it complies with these best practices or the reason for noncompliance.
This mechanism would enhance compliance with best practices, particularly since
delisting, which is the sole sanction for noncompliance with a governance listing
standard, rarely occurs.
This action could be taken by coordination among the exchanges similar to the
manner in which the audit committee standards and related Commission rules
were adopted several years ago. There are other possible means of conducting
this activity, including the establishment of a joint entity to consider and adopt
best practices. We discuss this in our report and will be prepared to meet with
the Commission and the exchanges concerning certain issues that need to be
resolved before a joint entity could be organized for this purpose to function on
an ongoing basis. We believe generally that uniformity in governance best prac-
tices is desirable, although in the first instance each exchange could vary its
formulation of practices, much as there are some variations in the audit committee
listing standards. Over time, however, we believe that there are significant advan-
tages to uniformity in terms of achieving good governance practices. Accom-
modation could be made in the uniform best practices for differences in types
of issuers.
Our recommendation is intended to enable focused corporate governance mea-
sures to be adopted promptly with participation by all interested groups. It is also
intended to be responsive to Chairman Pitt's letter of February 12, 2002 to the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. relative to
the strengthening of governance listing standards. The exchanges should be at
the center of the discussions on relevant governance issues for listed companies.
Any legal issues concerning the authority of the Commission and the exchanges
need not be resolved at this time. Neither the Commission nor any of the ex-
changes would be precluded from seeking to adopt listing standards under estab-
lished procedures. It is in the public interest that any systemic change be consid-
ered in a deliberate and thoughtful manner over time.
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ANNEX D
SOURCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, POLAND, JAPAN,
MALAYSIA, SOUTH KOREA AND BRAZIL
Corporate
Securities Law Governance Code
Corporation Law (Regulatory Body) (Issuing Body) Primary Exchange
United Companies Act 1985 Financial Services and U.K. Combined Code: London Stock Exchange
Markets Act 2000
(Financial Services
Authority)
Securities Trading Act
(Federal Securities
Supervisory Office)
Poland Commercial Code Securities Code (Securities
and Exchange
Commission)
Japan Commercial Code Securities and Exchanges Law
(Ministry of Finance)
Malaysia Companies Act
South Korea Commercial Code
Securities Industries Act
(Malaysia Securities
Commission)
Securities and Exchange Act
(Financial Supervisory
Commission)
Brazil Corporation Law Securities Commission Law
(Securities Commission)
Principles of Good
Governance and Code of
Best Practice (Committee
on Corporate Governance,
1998),
Cromme Commission Code:
German Corporate
Governance Code
(Government Commission,
February 2002)'
None
4
Corporate Governance
Principles (Japan
Corporate Governance
Forum)
Code of Principles and Best
Practices (High Level
Finance Committee on
Corporate Governance)
Code of Best Practice for
Corporate Governance
(Committee on Corporate
Governance, 1999)
Code of Best Practice
(Brazilian Institute of
Corporate Governance,
1999)
Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Warsaw Stock Exchange
Tokyo Stock Exchange'
Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange
Korean Stock Exchange
Sao Paulo Novo Mercado
1. In addition to the U.K. Combined Code, the following corporate governance codes have been issued in the United Kingdom: The Institute
of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators Code (Feb. 1991), the Institutional Shareholders' Committee Statement of Best Practice (Apr.
1991), the Cadhury Report (Dec. 1992), the Greenbury Report (July 1995), the Hampel Report (Jan. 1998), the Turnbull Report (Sept.
1999), the Hermes Investment Management L d. Statement on U.K. Corporate Governance & Voting Policy 2001 (Jan. 2001), the Association
of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds Code of Good Practice (Jan. 2001), and the Pensions Investment Research ConsultantsLtd. Shareholder
Voting Guidelines (Mar. 2001). The comply or explain requirement under U.K. listing rules relates to the U.K Combined Code,
2. Germany also has a limited liability company law, however, because only stock corporations can become public companies, this section will
only address matters under the Stock Corporation Act.
3. In addition to the German Cromme Commission Code, the following corporate governance codes have been issued in Germany: The Berlin
Initiative Code of Corporate Governance (Berlin Initiative Group, 2000) and the German Panel Corporate Governance Code (German Panel
on Corporate Governance, 2000). The comply or explain requirement under the German Transparency and Disclosure Law relates only to
the German Cramme Commission Code.
4. Although no completed corporate governance codes have been published in Poland, both the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics and
the Warsaw Corporate Governance Forum have recently published draft codes.
5. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has historically been the dominant exchange in Japan despite the existence of many regional exchanges. However,
there has been considerable consolidation among those regional exchanges and the emergence of new exchanges like JASDAQ, NASDAQ
Japan, and others.
Kingdom
Germany Stock Corporation Act
2

